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CASE NOTES
Conflict of Laws-Forum Will Not Hear Out-of-State Libel When Cause
of Action Arising From Same Libel Is Barred in Forum State.-Defend-
ant published an article in Life magazine which was distributed to Michigan
newsstands on February 18, 1959. Plaintiffs, alleging the article to be de-
famatory, initiated suit for libel on February 19, 1960 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.1 The court adopted the
"single-publication" rule by which the first substantial public release was deemed
publication of the entire edition and held that the action was barred by M~ichi-
gan's one-year statute of limitations.2 The court applied the Michigan conflict
of laws rule and refused to hear any causes of action which might have arisen
under the libel laws of other states. Tocco v. Timc, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 410
(E.D. Mich. 1961).
The common-law doctrine of libel asserts that when a defamation is com-
municated to a third person a publication occurs.3 In 1849, Brunswich V.
Harmer,4 establishing the "multiple-publication" rule, held that the sale of a
copy of libelous material seventeen years after its first publication by the de-
fendant was a new publication giving rise to a fresh cause of action. It was
reasoned that any other rule would allow malicious publishers to release a
small amount of libelous material and, after the running of the statute of limita-
tions, release their main effort with impunity. This fundamental statement was
accepted as controlling on the question of the running of the statute of limita-
tions until Wolfsdn v. Syracuse Newspapers, nc.3 was decided in 1938. There
the New York court rejected Brunswick and held that publication took place
at the time of the original circulation of the libel and that the statute of limita-
tions ran from that time. The rationale of the court was expressed in the state-
ment: If the bar of the statute of limitations can be lifted by [the 'multiple
publication' rule] .. .we may no longer term it a 'state of repose' which
makes effective [its] . ..purpose . .. to outlaw stale claims. a Thus two
rules of internal law are followed by various jurisdictions of the United States.T
1. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Tocco v. Time, Inc., 195
F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
2. Mlich. Comp. Laws § 609.13(5) (1948): "Actions founded upon libel or slander
shall be brought within 1 year from the time the cause of action accrues and not after-
wards . . .1
3. See, e.g., Hartmann v. American News, 69 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Wis. 1947). See aiso
Restatement, Torts § 57S, comment b (1933).
4. 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1349).
5. 254 App. Di. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dep't 1933), affd mem., 279 N.Y. 716, 18
N.E.2d 676 (1939).
6. Id. at 213, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 642. The court said that the number of copies circulated was
to be considered as an element of plaintiff's damages. Id. at 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 642. Sub-
stantial republication of the same libel gives rise to a second single cause of action. Gregoire
v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 293 N.Y. 119, S1 N.E.2d 45 (1943).
7. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 133 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 US. 3
(1943); see note 21 infra and accompanying text.
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Recently, the fact of nation-wide publication has combined with common-law
doctrine to give rise to the multi-state libel, presenting a difficult problem in
conflict of laws.8 It is possible for a libel circulated in fifty-one jurisdictions
of the United States to give rise to fifty-one separate causes of action. Libel,
being a transitory tort,9 is triable in a foreign jurisdiction and hence all fifty-
one causes of action are triable in a single court. In the usual tort case, the
forum applies the law of the jurisdiction wherein the tort occurred.' 0 How-
ever, litigation of multi-state libels in a single forum has presented a complex
problem, for it has been deemed impossible for a jury, charged with applying
the varying internal laws of the jurisdictions affected, to render a competent
verdict."
Although the courts have generally ignored the causes of action arising in
other jurisdictions,' 2 Hartmann v. Time, Inc.18 strictly applied the common-law
doctrine to a logical, but highly criticized, end.'4 Plaintiff, the subject of a
multi-state libel, had brought successive suits in the District of Columbia,'5
New York,' 6 Massachusetts,' 7 and Pennsylvania. In the first two suits' 8 the
statute of limitations was found to bar the actions; in the third suit, Massa-
chusetts, in questionable reliance upon the two earlier decisions, ruled that
the cause of action was res judicata. The Pennsylvania court, in applying the
common-law doctrine'9 to the "changed conditions created by magazines and
newspapers with national circulation, ' 20 held that the publication had taken
place in forty-eight states and that the plaintiff not only had a right, but was
even required, to have the forty-eight causes of action litigated in the one suit.-"
8. See, e.g., Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
9. Christopher v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1948).
10. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934).
11. See Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971-73 (1953).
12. An illustration of the court's reluctance to combine all causes of action accruing In
a multi-state libel was seen when Congressman Sweeney was libeled in a newspaper column
syndicated in many states. He brought a single suit in every affected jurisdiction for the
cause of action arising there; in each case the court confined itself to the cause of action
arising in its jurisdiction. In Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288,
289 (2d Cir. 1941), the court judicially noted that the other similar suits acted only as
inconclusive evidence in the case at bar. See Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L.
Rev. 959, 964-65 (1953).
13. 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947).
14. Note, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 932 (1948).
15. See 166 F.2d at 136.
16. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 60 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mer., 271 App.
Div. 781, 66 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1946).
17. See 166 F.2d at 136-37.
18. The first suit was brought in the District of Columbia and its unreported opinion
is discussed in 166 F.2d at 136. The second suit was Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 60 N.Y.S.2d
209.
19. 166 F.2d at 132.
20. Ibid.
21. The court reasoned that if Life were to be published in England, "whether the
plaintiff would have a cause of action against the defendant in England would depend on
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The Pennsylvania conflict of laws rule required the application of the law of
the places where the causes of action accrued. Accordingly, the court divided
the affected jurisdictions into states which applied the "multiple-publication"
rule, and those states where the "single-publication" rule controlled, and then
determined the effect of each rule upon the causes of action.2- The libel arising
in Illinois, a single-publication state, was found to have been published one
day before that in Pennsylvania, the other single-publication state in the
litigation2 3 The court reasoned that the effect of successive publication in
single-publication states was that the first cause of action "engrossed" the
second cause of action and left the Illinois " 'single publication' cause of
action.., the only [one] ... arising under the 'single publication' rule....
The "engrossing" Illinois cause of action was subsequently barred by the Penn-
sylvania statute of limitations.2 5 Thus a holding of res judicata for both single-
publication states was effected. The court further held that it was not so as to
the plaintiff's causes of action arising in those states which followed the older
rule "that each time a [libelous] magazine . . . is sold or distributed a new
publication has occurred." 20 Therefore the plaintiff's causes of action which
were not barred in the multiple-publication states, were held to he alive and
actionable in the forum.
A few courts have followed Hartmann to a limited extent, taking a restricted
view of the facts of each case, and narrowing the applicable law to that of a
single jurisdiction. In Mattoy. v. NeV'ws Syndicate Co.,27 plaintiff sued in New
York for a libel circulated by defendant newspaper in New York, Virginia,
and neighboring states. Recognizing New York's adherence to the lco Toci
delicti conflicts rule, the court discussed the problem of the applicable law
when the same libel had been published in several jurisdictions and stated,
"Ve assume that in any event a plaintiff must recover in one action all his
damages for all the publications, wherever made; but, if the publication in
each state is a separate wrong, the extent of the liability may vary in the
the law of England and not on that of Pennsylvania or Illinois. This conclusion is pertinent
in respect to any cause of action which the plaintiff may have in any of the States of the
United States .... The plaintiff's statement of claim ... does not limit the accrual of the
cause or causes of action to Illinois or to any other State of the United States.... Wes
therefore .. . must treat the allegations of the complaint as to the place- where publica-
tion occurred as covering the United States .... " Id. at 133.
22. Id. at 134-35.
23. Id. at 135.
24. Ibid. The Illinois cause of action was barred by the Illinois one-year statute of
limitations. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 33, § 14 (Smith-Hurd 1956). The court could have found the
action initiated January 17, 1945 arising from the publication at Pennsylvania nev.-ztands
on January 10, 1944, barred by the Pennsylvania one-year statute of limitations, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 31 (1953), without resorting to an interpretation of "engrossment." 166
F.2d at 135.
25. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 39 (1953) provides that when a cause of action is fully
barred by the laws of the state in which it arose, such bar shall be a complete defense to
an action brought in any of the courts of Pennsylvania.
26. 166 F.2d at 136.
27. 176 F.2d S97 (2d Cir.-1949).
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separate jurisdictions .... *"28 The court, however, circumvented the difficulty
of litigating separate wrongs by finding that plaintiff had been damaged only
in Virginia, thus treating the multi-state libel as one cause of action. Hartmann
was followed in Kilian v. Stackpole Sons.2 9 There, in the forum which had
litigated Hartmann three years previously, the court decided that the plain-
tiff's cause of action for publication in Pennsylvania was barred by the
statute of limitations. Plaintiff then amended his pleadings and sought damages
for causes of action accruing in Wisconsin, Washington, and Florida, states
with declared "multiple-publication" rules. The Pennsylvania court, however,
strictly applied the Wisconsin common law and the action was dismissed for
lack of publication."0
After finding the "single-publication" rule controlling and finding the cause of
action resulting from the multi-state libel barred by Michigan's statute of
limitations, the present court concerned itself with the problem created by
libels arising in other states. The court denominated the problem a "myriad
[of] conceptual difficulties" 3' and expressly repudiated the Hartmann decision
and rationale.3 2 Since Michigan had chosen an internal law designed to bar
the Michigan claim as stale, the court reasoned that it would defeat the legis-
lative purpose were it to permit equally stale claims to be litigated. As a
result, the court held that it was precluded by the "single-publication" doctrine
from hearing the out-of-state causes of action.
A rule of consistency was thus effected in the nationwide libel: when the
cause of action arising in the forum state is barred, all causes of action arising
in other states are barred in the forum. This statement of the law eliminates
the uncertainty common to the treatment of multi-state libels by barring the
consideration of every such libel on the basis of the laws of the affected juris-
diction.33 In actual practice, it is Hartmann, where the jury was charged to
consider the effect of an overwhelming variety of libel laws on fifty-one wrongs
based on the same defamatory statement, which ignores the realities of the multi-
state libel. The instant court,34 in limiting the problem to a single jurisdiction
28. Id. at 900.
29. 98 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
30. The Washington and Florida causes of action were dismissed because of plaintiff's
failure to offer proof to support them. Id. at 505-06.
31. 195 F. Supp. at 414.
32. Ibid.
33. Dale Sys., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D.C. Conn. 1953) (court barred
other actions by applying law of plaintiff's domicile); Dale Sys., Inc. v. General Teleradlo,
Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (court discussed five conflict rules but chose none).
See Ass'n for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice v. Simon, 298 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.
1962). In this case, the rationale of the single-publication rule would require the bar-
ring of a cause of action arising in a foreign jurisdiction if the cause of action was barred
in the forum regardless of New York's commitment to the lex loci delicti conflict rule.
34. In thus settling the law, the court still allows the plaintiff the opportunity to bring
his cause of action in another jurisdiction, for the general rule treats a statute of limita-
tions defense as a matter of procedure. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 603 (1934).
When plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations in one state, plaintiff
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framework, offers the only logical alternative to a federally legislated uniform
law.35
Constitutional Law-Applicability of the "Original Package" Doctrine to
Prohibit State Taxation of Goods Imported for SaIe.-Plaintiff, a Wisconsin
liquor dealer, imported wines and liquors from abroad which were stored in
their original packages in the bonded portion of the plaintiff's warehouse.1
Defendant city levied an ad valorem property tax on all of the imported liquor
and the board of review upheld the assessment. The circuit court reversed?
On appeal the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the circuit court, holding
that the tax on the imported liquor "whether inside or outside of the bonded
warehouse area, not sold or consigned and still in the original unopened
cases or containers... " violated the import-export clause of the United States
Constitution. State ex rel. H. A. Morton Co. v. Board of Review, - Wis. 2d
-, 112 N.W.2d 914, 917 (1962).
The import-eport clause of the United States Constitution vests in the fed-
eral government the exclusive power to tax imports.3 The purpose in prohibit-
ing state taxation of imports was to insure equal taxing opportunities among
the states, i.e., to prevent the coastal states from levying a tax on goods orig-
inally destined for shipment to the interior states.A Thus, the general power
of the states to tax property within their borders was limited by the exclusive
grant of power to the federal government to tax imports. The issue arises,
therefore, as to the point in time when an import ceases to be immune from
the state taxing power. In 1827 Chief Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Mary-
land,5 attempted to define this transition point. The State of Maryland had
enacted a law requiring all importers to pay a license fee of fifty dollars.
Defendant was convicted of selling foreign goods without a state license. Mar-
shall treated the tax on the business of importing-however valid this reason-
ing may be-as equivalent to a tax on the thing imported.0 Faced therefore,
is not "precluded from maintaining an action to enforce the claim in another State if it is
not barred by the Statute of Limitations in that State." See also Restatement, Judgments
§ 49, comment a (1942); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 137-38 (3d Cir. 1947).
35. See Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959 (1953).
1. The tax assessment also included a portion of the imported liquor which plaintifi had
stored in the unbonded area of his warehouse.
2.- Wis. Cir. Ct. - (1961).
3. U.S. Cost. art. I, § 10: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congrezs, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws. .. "
4. This clause was designed to prevent the "great importing states . . . [from levyingl
a tax on the non-importing states," to which the imported property was or might be
destined. This taxation by the importing states would of course be discriminatory and
thus the "power of laying duties on imports was . . . taken from the states." Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 440 (1827).
5. Id. at 419.
6. Id. at 437-3S.
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with the immunity extended to imports by the Constitution, the Court held
that imported goods were not subject to state taxation until the article was
either sold or removed from its original package and thereby "incorporated
and mixed up with the mass of property in the country."7 The purpose of
Marshall's "original package" doctrine was to define that point in time when
the thing imported lost its "distinctive character as an import"8 and therefore
its immunity. Subsequent cases applied this doctrine as a constitutional man-
date rather than a rule of construction. 9
Strict adherence to the "original package" rule was evidenced as late as
1945. The Court, in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,10 held that a six months
supply of goods, imported for use in manufacturing and stored in the importers'
warehouse in their original packages, was not subject to state taxation. The
Court, while relying upon the Brown decision, refused to distinguish between
goods imported for sale and those imported for manufacture."
However, in the consolidated opinion of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Bowers, and United States Plywood Corp. v. City of Algoma,12 the Court relaxed
the Brown doctrine and devised the "current operational needs" test.'8 Under
this test imported goods placed in reserve inventory for use in manufacturing
were held to have lost their "distinctive character as 'imports' ,a4 even though
they were still in the original package. The Court reasoned that once the
goods had been introduced into this reserve inventory they were so "irrevoca-
bly committed to 'use in manufacturing'" that they were already involved in
the manufacturing process.15
The Court had before it three separate transactions: Youngstown concerned
the importation of raw material in the original bales. A three to six months
supply of these materials was stored in an enclosed area adjacent to the fac-
tory. United States Plywood concerned the importation of green lumber and
finished veneers. The veneers were received in bundles and were placed un-
opened in the importer's warehouse. The green lumber was laid out to be air-
7. Id. at 441.
8. Id. at 442.
9. See, e.g., Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933); May
v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900). The cases after Brown defined other ways In which
the imported article became commingled with the mass of goods in the state, e.g., placing
the goods in the process of manufacturing and thereby changing their character, Gulf
Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124, 126 (1928) (a tax on imported fish was not
prohibited when the fish became "through processing, handling and sale a part of the
mass of property subject to taxation by the state."); using the goods, Southern Pac.
Co. v. City of Calexico, 288 Fed. 634 (S.D. Cal. 1923) (a pledging of the goods was held
to be a use of them).
10. 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
11. Id. at 668.
12. 358 U.S. 534 (1959). See Comment, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 343 (1959); Note, 27
Fordhan L. Rev. 278 (1958).
13. Id. at 547.
14. Id. at 548.
15. Id. at 546.
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dried in a storage yard adjacent to the factory. The Court reasoned that the
green lumber, since it was laid out to dry, was already in the manufacturing
process and, therefore, subject to state taxation.10 The raw material and
veneers, however, had no immediate purpose other than as a reserve inventory.
But the Court reasoned that the goods in reserve inventory were necessary in
order that the importers continue their business operation, i.e., production and
sales, and therefore, had lost their "distinctive character as 'imports.' "IT While
the Court in Youngstown stated that it was not overruling the Hooven deci-
sion,' 8 it would appear that by a process of insufficient distinction Hooven
must be restricted to its facts.19 The practical effect of the decision is that the
"original package" doctrine, if it has any application at all, affects only goods
imported for sale.
The instant court adhered strictly to the distinction drawn in Youngstown
between goods imported for sale and goods imported for manufacture and,
therefore, held that the "original package" doctrine still applied to the formerf
0
While it is true that the majority in Youngstown did not state how goods im-
ported for sale were to be treated, the dissent declared that the "original pack-
age" doctrine was completely overturned since there was no rational distinction
between goods imported for sale and goods imported for use in manufacture
under the "current operational needs" test.2 1
The question, therefore, is the effect of the "current operational needs" test
on the status of goods imported for sale, and more precisely, the meaning of
the test itself. If the Court in Youngstown intended that only those goods
necessary to keep the business a going concern should be subject to state taxa-
tion, then the Court has, it seems, substituted a nebulous standard for the
16. Id. at 549.
17. Id. at 543.
18. Id. at 544.
19. Ibid. The Court in Hooven stated that it was not considering the case where the
presence of the imported goods was essential to current manufacturing requirements so
that it could be said to have entered the process of manufacturing. 324 U.. at 667.
The Court in Youngstown predicated its opinion on this very point. 358 U.S. at 544.
But Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion pointed out that the vast bull: of
imports are brought in for commercial purposes and to be exposed for sale in their original
form or to be used as raw materials in manufacturing, ie., for operational needs. He
concluded that the result of the decision was that "if imported goods are needed, they are
taxable. If useless, they retain their constitutional immunity." Id. at 570.
20. - Wis. 2d at -, 112 N.V.2d at 916. The court quoted the Youngstown Court's
dictum: "Whatever may be the significance of retaining in the 'original pachage' goods
that have been imported for sale.. . goods that have been so imported for use in manu-
facturing are not exempt from taxation, though not removed from the 'original package,' if,
as found here, they have been 'put to the use for which they [were] imported.'" - Wis.
2d at -, 112 N.W.2d at 916, citing 35S US. 534 at 543. The Wisconsin court states that
this "dearly indicated that . . . [the Supreme Court] was not abolishing the 'original
package' doctrine as applied to unopened stocks of goods imported for sfale. ." - Wis.
2d at -, 112 N.W.2d at 916.
21. 358 U.S. 534, 564 n.12.
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arbitrary, but practical "original package" doctrine.2 2 A more reasonable inter-
pretation would be that the "current operational needs" test is addressed to
whether the imported goods have been appropriated to use within the
particular state, either for resale or manufacture, i.e., whether the goods
have reached their ultimate destination.2" Such a construction would permit
state taxation of all imported goods except those imports present within a state
merely for the purpose of transport to their final destination. This approach
would adequately define that point when the goods lost their quality as imports,
and would, on the other hand, preserve the original purpose of the constitutional
provision to prevent a state from levying a tax on the goods simply because it is
the importing state. Thus, Youngstown's "current operational needs" test belies
the instant court's implication that the "original package" doctrine is a consti-
tutional requirement.24  On the contrary, the Youngstown decision indicates
that the doctrine is, in the final analysis, merely a rule of construction.25
It is clear that the "current operational needs" test has replaced the "original
package" doctrine with respect to goods imported for use in manufacturing. The
latter, however, still prescribes the outer limits of import immunity from state
taxation with respect to goods imported for sale. That is to say, an importing
state may tax goods imported for sale though in their original packages, if
that state is the place of ultimate destination. Under this reasoning it would
22. "Although more subtle, more befogging cases might be imagined, it was 'plain' that,
at least while in the hands of the importer in its original form or package, the foreign
good remained an import and thus free from state levies." Id. at 559 (dissenting opinion).
In all the cases prior to Youngstown, the state tax was allowed only where it was shown
that the goods had lost their character as foreign imports by a change in their physical
form or by an actual use of them or resale. Cf. cases cited note 9 supra. The difficulty in
applying the "current operational needs" test in different manufacturing situations would
be formidable if it were strictly construed. The issue would have to be determined by a
subjective determination of just what the "current operational needs" actually are, which,
in turn, would appear to depend solely on the intent of the importer.
23. Cf. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). These cases were concerned
with interstate commerce at a time when goods in interstate commerce were considered
imports under the import-export clause. See Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123
(1868). In the License Cases the Court refused to sustain a tax on goods while they
were "in transitu," that is before they had reached their final destination. A tax on the
goods while in transit would in effect constitute a transit duty on the goods. The Court's
objection to a transit tax was based upon the realization that although the foreign importa-
tion physically ends in the coastal state, the latter may be merely a conduit for subsequent
transportation to an interior state. We may derive from this a theory in favor of allow-
ing taxation when the goods have reached their ultimate destination. This would not, it Is
submitted, conflict with the rationale of the import-export clause.
24. "[T]he import-export clause of the constitution protects goods imported for sale
while they are in their original packages . . . ." State ex rel. H. A. Morton Co. v. Board
of Review, - Wis. 2d -, -, 112 N.W.2d 914, 916 (1962).
25. Cf. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935), where Mr. Justice Cardozo said
that "the test of the original package is not an ultimate principle. It is an illustration of
a principle." Id. at 526-27 (dictum). It should be noted, however, that the state tax
in Baldwin had been imposed on goods in interstate commerce.
[Vol. 30
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appear that the instant court's strict adherence to the "original package" doctrine
was unwarranted. Once the goods arrived at the importer's warehouses, ear-
marked for sale, it is submitted that they had reached their ultimate destination
and therefore had lost their distinctive character as imports.
Constitutional Law-State Statute Requiring Bible Reading in Public
Schools Held Unconstitutional.-Petitionerl contended that a Pennsylvania
statuteO requiring the daily reading of the Holy Bible in public schools violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment.3 Petitioners' children at-
tended Abington Senior High School, where at the beginning of each school
day ten verses of the King James Version of the Bible were read to the chil-
dren, without comment, over a public address system. After the reading, the
children recited, with the public address system leading them, the Lord's Prayer.
Announcements were then made, after which the children went to class. The
statute provided that a child would be excused from Bible reading upon the
written request of the parents.4 The district court held that the statute con-
stituted an establishment of religion in violation of the first amendment.
Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. S15 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
What is proscribed and what is permitted by the "establishment of re-
ligion" clause of the first amendment? Aid to religion-whether it be "federal
fashion"3 or "state style" 6-starting with Bradfield v. Robcrts and continu-
ing through Engel v. Vitales has been a constant source of litigation. Yet the
establishment clause, despite the many opinions, legal as well as nonlegal, still
defies an interpretation delineating between what is proscribed and what is
permissible.
The instant court, in arriving at its decision, stated that the case was
governed by McCollum v. Board of Educ.0 In McCollum, a system of religious
instruction conducted by representatives of various religions in public school
buildings during hours when the children were compelled to attend school was
1. Petitioners are members of the Unitarian faith.
2. "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the
opening of each public school on each school day." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 15-1516
(Supp. 1960).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. . . ." US. Const. amend. I.
4. "Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading ... upon the written request
of his parent or guardian." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (Supp. 1960). No panalty
was directly imposed by the statute for teachers who failed to adhere to the mandatory
bible reading. The teacher may, however, have his contract of employment terminated for
the wilful Niolation of school laws. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (Supp. 19t0).
S. Manning, Aid to Education-Federal Fashion, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 495 (1961).
6. Manning, Aid to Education-State Style, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 525 (1961).
7. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
S. 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659, cert. granted, 363 U.S. 924 (1961),
30 Fordhain L. Rev. 503 (1962).
9. 333 U.S. 203 (194S).
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declared unconstitutional. Since the constitutionality of any released time pro-
gram must be decided on an ad hoc basis,10 the mere use of public buildings
for sectarian purposes is not a per se establishment of religion." The aid to
religion which the McCollum Court found repugnant to the establishment
clause was the integration of religious instructions with a compulsory school
attendance law, i.e., a degree of compulsion. 12 A released-time program care-
fully prepared to exclude any degree of compulsion was held constitutional in
Zorach v. Clauson.13 In Engel v. Vitale,14 the New York Court of Appeals
found the daily voluntary recitation of a non-sectarian prayer's in a public
school to be a violation of neither the state nor federal constitutions. In the
Engel case, a child could absent himself from the room or remain silent therein
at the time of the recitation. 16 In the absence of compulsion, the New York
court found no violation of the free exercise clause and held that the estab-
lishment clause was never intended to preclude the mere acknowledgement of
a belief in a Supreme Being.'7
A degree of compulsion was present in the instant case, in that the Penn-
sylvania statute required the child to be present during the Bible reading un-
less excused upon the written request of his parents.' 8 The excused child could
remain outside the room during the Bible reading;"' however, those not pres-
ent might miss important announcements which immediately followed the
recitation. 20 The basic facts upon which the instant court predicated its finding
of compulsion appear similar to the circumstances in the Engel decision. In
Engel, however, the child could be excused from presence in the school build-
ing itself at the time of the recitation, and there was no possibility that a
child would miss important announcements. 21
Independent of compulsion, the instant court found an establishment of
religion in that the Holy Bible is a Christian document, and hence the reading
prefers the Christian religion over others.22 The court concluded that Bible
10. Id. at 231.
11. See Note, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 503, 506 (1962).
12. 333 U.S. at 212.
13. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
14. 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659, cert. granted, 368 U.S. 924 (1961).
15. "'Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our County.'" Id. at 179, 176 N.E.2d at
580, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
16. 18 Misc. 2d 659, 696, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 492-93 (Sup. Ct. 1959). The New York
Supreme Court held that it was within the school board's discretion to decide which safe-
guards were sufficient to protect the childrens' right of free exercise of religion. Such safe-
guards must, of course, fit within the framework of constitutional requirements. Within
this framework a provision that children may arrive a few minutes late or attend separate
opening exercises was clearly allowed.
17. 10 N.Y.2d at 180, 176 N.E.2d at 581, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
18. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (Supp. 1960).
19. 201 F. Supp. at 818.
20. Ibid.
21. See supra note 16.
22. 201 F. Supp. at 819.
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reading followed by a mass recitation of the Lord's Prayer was in effect a
"religious observance."2'
The instant case appears to be correctly decided since the reading of
the Bible seems to prefer the Christian religions, and further, the reading of the
King James version and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer-by association-
however valid this reasoning may be-seem to prefer one Christian religion over
another. However, the court's reliance on McCollum is questionable on two
grounds. First, the "essential facts" 24 in McCollum are quite different from the
factual situation in the instant case. The Pennsylvania statute, the instant court
held, violated the establishment clause even in the absence of compulsion. In
McCollum, however, absent the compulsion, no violation of the establishment
clause would have been present,2 since there was neither a preference of one
religion over another nor a preference of religion over irreligion. Second, it is
doubtful whether McCollum, in light of Zorach v. Clason,2 represents the law
today. It seems that the instant court itself was concerned with the validity of
McCollum for it cited Mr. Justice Douglas' dictum, in the Zorach case, reaffirm-
ing McCollum.27
The decision by the court in the present case, however, does not, it is sub-
mitted, affect the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in the Engel
case. In Engel, even if a degree of compulsion existed, the recitation of a non-
sectarian prayer was not an establishment of religion.23 Although there is a
preference of religion over irreligion in Engel, the only alternative was a pref-
erence of irreligion over religion. Such a preference "is not mere neutrality
... [but] it is an interference by the courts contrary to the plain language of
the Constitution, on the side of those who oppose religion."- In other words,
it is an interference with the free exercise of religion by those consenting to
the program. In such a situation it is proper and logical to balance the estab-
lishment clause against the free exercise clause.30 The preference of some re-
ligions over others in the instant case offers an alternative basis for the decision
which is not repugnant to the Nation's religious tradition-state neutrality in
religious affairs. This alternative does not require the balancing of the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses.
Eminent Domain-Airport Owner Liable to Adjacent Land Owner for
Low-Flying Aircraft.-Respondent, the County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania,
was the owner and operator of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The Pennsyl-
x-ania Court of Common Pleas held respondent liable in damages for low land-
23. Ibid.
24. 'Its essential facts and those of McCollum are quite similar." Ibid.
25. See Note, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 503, 506 (1962).
26. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
27. "We follow the McCollum case.' 343 US. 306, 315 (1952). The instant court men-
tions Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), as well, to reaffirm the holding of McCollum.
28. 10 N.Y.2d at 10, 176 N.E.2d at 5S1, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
29. Id. at 184, 176 N.E.2d at 583, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
30. See Note, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 503, 509 (1962).
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ings and take-offs of aircraft, which rendered petitioner's property, located in
the vicinity of the airfield, undesirable and useless for residential use. The trial
court reasoned, that the "invasion" of petitioner's property constituted a "tak-
ing" of an air easement over the property for which, under the fourteenth amend-
ment, just compensation must be paid.1 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed, holding that even if there had been a "taking" in the
constitutional sense,2 the "taking" was not the act of the county and, therefore,
respondent was not liable.$ The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held "that respondent, which was the pro-
moter, owner and lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances the one who
took the air easement in the constitutional sense. Respondent decided . . .
where the airport would be built, what runways it would need, their direction
and length, and what land and navigation easements would be needed ...
Respondent in designing it had to acquire some private property. Our con-
clusion is that by constitutional standards it did not acquire enough." 4 Griggs
v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962).
Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, was, under the Eng-
lish common law, the accepted maxim which meant that the owner of a parcel
of land also owned, in conjunction therewith, a segment of soil and atmosphere
reaching from the depths of the earth to the upper reaches of the skyY Any
unprivileged penetration of either air or subterranean rights therefore consti-
tuated an actionable infringement.6 This doctrine never met with favor in the
United States, however, where, apart from the matter of state sovereignty in
1. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 108 Pa. L.J. 65 (1961).
2. It has been held that "a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by
statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public
use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority,
wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States. .. ." Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
3. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961).
4. More specifically, the uncontr6verted facts of the case were as follows: "Regular
and almost continuous daily flights, often several minutes apart, have been made by a
number of airlines directly over and very, very close to plaintiff's residence. During these
flights it was often impossible for people in the house to converse or to talk on the
telephone. The plaintiff and the members of his household . . . were frequently unable
to sleep even with ear plugs and sleeping pills; they would frequently be awakened by
the flight and the noise of the planes; the windows of their home would frequently rattle
and at times plaster fell down from the walls and ceilings; their health was affected and
impaired, and they sometimes were compelled to sleep elsewhere. Moreover, their house was
so close to the runways or path of glide that as the spokesman for the members of the
Airlines Pilot Association admitted 'if we had engine failure we would have no course
but to plow into your house.'" Id. at 422, 168 A.2d at 128-29.
5. 2 C.J.S. Aerial Navigation § 3 (1936).
6. Thus a gun shot was held actionable as a trespass in Peabody v. United States, 231
U.S. 530 (1913), as was a projecting eave in Harrington v. McCarthy, 169 Mass. 492, 48
N.E. 278 (1897). In the same vein a telephone wire was held a ground for ejectment
in Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906).
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air space, a landowner's rights in the space above his land are not unlimited,
and extend only to the point of reasonable possibility of use
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 expressly established national sovereignty
in air space, stating that "the United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign
nations, complete sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of the
United States . .. ,,s The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 "recognized and
declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a public right of
freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of the United
States."' Subsequently the Civil Aeronautics Board, in accordance with its
powers to implement the Civil Aeronautics Act, published a definition of navi-
gable air space which has since been codified by Congress; its regulation pre-
scribed the national navigable air space as that space above 1000 feet in con-
gested areas and above 500 feet in all other areas.' 0 Aircraft which flew beneath
this navigable air space were subject to liability for damage caused thereby."
At this time, however, the navigable air space was not construed as including
space necessary for landings and take-offs but was restricted to the 1000 and
500 foot minimums established for planes in flight. '
In the 1946 case of United States v. Causby,13 the United States Supreme
Court was, for the first time, presented with the question of liability for damage
to property caused by aircraft landing and taking off. Plaintiff Causby alleged
that the low-flying military aircraft caused the complete destruction of his
poultry business and kept his family constantly in a state of fear, nervousness
and sleeplessness. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances there
had been a taking in the constitutional sense of an air easement for which
compensation was required to be paid by the federal government as the owner
and operator of the low-flying aircraft.' 4 The Court affirmed the view that the
7. For an excellent discussion of this common law doctrine -ee Swetland v. Curts Air-
ports Corp., 41 F.2d 929, 934-40 (N.D. Ohio 1930).
8. 44 Stat. 56S (1926).
9. 52 Stat. 9S0 (1933), 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1953).
10. The Board's regulation provided as follows: "Except when necessary for take-off
or landing no person shall operate an aircraft below the following altitudes: (a) Anywhere.
An altitude which will permit, in the event of the failure of a power unit, an emeragency
landing without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface; (b) Over congested
areas. Over the congested areas of cities, towns or settlements, or over an opn-air
assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizon-
tal radius of 2,COD feet from the aircraft. . . (c) Over other than congested area-. An
altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas.
In such event, the aircraft shall not be operated closer than S0 feet to any p2ron, vezasl,
vehicle, or structure. . . ." Civil Aeronautics Reg., 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1962).
11. Thus a farmer was permitted to recover for personal injuries sustained and for
the value of horses lost when they bolted in fear and ran away due to a low-flying (150
feet high) dirigible. Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761 (ND. Ohio
1929).
12. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (ND. Ohio 1930).
13. 328 US. 256.
14. Id. at 267.
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path of the glide slope for landing and taking off was not included within the
statutory definition of navigable air space.1r It took pains, however, to point
out that not every landing or take-off is violative even though it may occur
beneath the navigable air space limit. In the language of the Court:
The airplane is part of the modem environment of life, and the inconveniences which
it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment. . . . Flights
over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land. .... 1.
Thus aircraft making frequent low flights outside the protection of the navi-
gable air space were not liable for a constitutional "taking" per se; some damage
to the persons or property beneath had to be established.
Following the Causby case, Congress redefined navigable airspace to mean
"airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations
issued under this Act, and shall include airspace needed to insure safety in take-
off and landing of aircraft." 7 This change was upheld in Allegheny Airlines v.
Village of Cedarhurst'8 where, in an action by an airline operator to declare
unconstitutional a village ordinance prohibiting flights within the defined
navigable airspace, the circuit court of appeals rejected the contention of the
village that government authorization for landings and take-offs at less than
500 feet constituted a "taking" without compensation. The court held that
there was no evidence that the operations constituted a trespass or a nuisance
to the people of the village and that "such findings preclude the possibility
of finding a 'taking' within the doctrine of the Causby case." 19
Just as flights previously under the 500 foot limit were not necessarily
violative, however, flights now within the prescribed landing and take-off limits
beneath 500 feet were not necessarily privileged or immune. It has been
held that although a license to land and take off exists as part of the
navigable air space, it cannot be used to the unlawful injury of those be-
neath 20 Thus it would appear that an action for a "taking" exists regardless
of the limits of navigable airspace on landings and take-offs, if the flights in
question cause a substantial interference with the enjoyment and use of the land
beneath.
The Court in the instant case recognized that the flights in question were
within the established FAA-approved slope-paths and thus within the naviga-
ble airspace, but nevertheless held the respondent liable, relying in great part
on the Causby case: "[T]he use of land presupposes the use of some of the
airspace above it .... Otherwise, no home could be built, no trees planted, no
fence constructed, no chimney erected ."21 In Causby, however, the
15. Id. at 264.
16. Id. at 266. See also Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937).
17. Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 789 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
18. 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
19. Id. at 816. (Italics added.)
20. Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947).
21. 369 U.S. at 88-89, citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
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federal government was liable as owner of the aircraft (although the Govern-
ment was also the owner and operator of the airport). Here the owner, who
was also the operator of the airport, was held liable and the majority reasoned
that the federal government, which controls all flight procedures (including
the angle and height of the glide slope) through the Federal Aviation Agency,
would not be liable for the taking of the easement over petitioner's land.2
In other respects the two cases are quite similar. In Causby the family resi-
dence was located 2275 feet from the end of the runway and the barn housing
the chickens only 2220 feet away. The official glide slope passed over the
property at a height of eighty-three feet resulting in a sixty-seven foot clearance
over the house and a sixty-three foot clearance over the barn.2 3 Defendant was
charged with having rendered the property useless as a chicken farm and for
having caused the family to lose sleep and to become nervous and frightened. 21
In the instant case the home was located farther from the runway, 3250 feet,
but its location on a small hill negated the added distance. The glide slope
passed eighty-one feet over the property resulting in an 11.36 foot minimum
glide slope clearance over petitioner's chimney. Flights regularly cleared the
residence by as little as thirty feet on take-offs and fifty-three feet on landingsY.
Respondent was charged with having caused petitioner and his family to become
nervous and distraught and with having rendered petitioners' home undesirable
and unbearable for residential purposes.2 0
Inasmuch as the Causby decision seems to have been based on the fact that
landing and take-off altitudes were not included within the definition of the
navigable airspace, it is questionable whether the same defendant (the owner
and operator of the aircraft) would be held liable today on the same facts. The
reasoning of the instant case would seem to be that since approach and de-
parture slopes are part of the navigable airspace, the one who chose the loca-
tion of the slope (the airport owner) should be held answerable for any result-
ing damage rather than the owner and operator of the aircraft who has no choice
but to follow the specified glide slope into the runway. Clearly, however, the
owner and operator of the aircraft would be liable if damage ensued from a
flight which was in violation of the official glide slope and thus not within the
navigable airspace. This distinction would seem logical and is not without
some precedent. As early as 1930 it was held that "in such instances, to fly
over the lands of an adjoining owner at lower altitudes [than the navigable
airspace], the owners of airports must secure the consent of adjoining property
owners, or acquire such right by condemnation ... ."27 This same logic was
applied more recently in the case of Ackerman v. Port of Seattle.2s In holding
the airport operator liable for low flights the court held:
22. Id. at S9-90.
23. 328 U.S. at 258.
24. Id. at 259.
25. 369 U.S. at S6-S7.
26. Id. at 87.
27. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929, 942 (NfD. Ohio 1930), which was
decided before approaches were within the navigable air-pace.
28. 55 Wash. 2d 400, 34S P.2d 664 (1960).
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Having the power to acquire an approach way by condemnation, the Port, allegedly,
failed to exercise that power, with the result that the appellants' private airspace
is allegedly being used as an approach way, without just compensation first having
been paid to them. Clearly, an adequate approach way is as necessary a part of an
airport as is the ground on which the airstrip, itself, is constructed, if the private
airspace of adjacent landowners is not to be invaded by airplanes using the air-
port.29
The dissent in the instant case argued that there could not possibly have been
a "taking" by the airport owner since the United States had already acquired
all necessary easements by pre-empting the navigable airspace.80 The dissenting
Justices argued that exclusive liability for this "taking" should rest with the
federal government.31 Thus Mr. Justice Black wrote: "And where Congress has
already declared airspace free to all . . . pretty clearly it need not again be
acquired by an airport." 32 However, if in fact Congress did intend to take
easements in the navigable airspace, thus precluding anyone else from doing
the same, there would have been no need for Congress to have enacted Sec-
tion 1112 of the Federal Airport Act, which provides for reimbursement to air-
port operators for purchases of easements "through or other interests in air-
space."133 Although the majority in the instant case, in a dictum, rejected the
dissent's argument that the federal government should be liable for having
pre-empted the airspace, there is some merit to the argument that the federal
government should ultimately be liable, at least in part.
It is clear that the congressional declaration with respect to United States
sovereignty in navigable airspace34 was not, in itself, a "taking" in the consti-
tutional sense. It was rather the flights through this air space (including the
glide slope) with their consequent damage to property rights, which consti-
tuted the "taking." However, a further question to be answered is whether
the Government's general pre-emption of the navigable airspace, along with
the specific authorization to respondent in this case to use the' airspace, were
together sufficient to constitute such a "taking." That is, did the damage
accompanying the authorized use constitute a "taking" by the Government
as opposed to the airport owner? This may well have been what the dissent
was indicating when it emphasized the Government's approval of respondent's
proposed airport plan and its subsequent commissioning of the glide slope.85
Another possible argument for federal liability has its foundation in contract
law. Under an agreement between the airport owner and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration,36 the federal government was to share fifty to seventy-five
per cent of allowable project costs including the "costs of acquiring land or
29. Id. at 413, 348 P.2d at 671.
30. 369 U.S. at 92-93.
31. Id. at 94.
32. Id. at 93.
33. 60 Stat. 177 (1946), 49 U.S.C. § 1112 (1958).
34. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
35. 369 U.S. at 91-93.
36. The agreement was executed pursuant to the terms of the Federal Airport Act. 369
U.S. at 86.
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interest therein or easements through or other interests in airspace. 7 The
agreement specifically provided that the total project cost estimate approved
by the Administrator could subsequently be revised upward to include addi-
tional costs not to exceed ten per cent of the approved amount.CS The majority
has held that there was a "taking" by respondent of what amounted to an ease-
ment in petitioners land. 9 This being so, it would seem only proper that the
federal government reimburse respondent for fifty to seventy-five per cent of
the cost of the "easement" as it had contracted to do pursuant to the terms
of the original contract. Of necessity, the reimbursable expenses would be
limited to those reflecting only the value of the easement itself, and would
not include other separable surface damages for which an airport owner may
also have been assessed.
In any event, by holding the airport owner liable, the Court has entered
into an area of litigation which could conceivably open a "Pandora's box."
Care must be exercised in the application of the law of this case lest the develop-
ment of the national airport plan and of commercial aviation be seriously
impeded. The facts of both the Causby and the instant case certainly warranted
holdings in favor of the property owners. However, the criterion of distance
from the runway alone is inadequate, as a comparison of the two cases will show,
but must be considered in conjunction with elevation and the position of the
glide slope. Each case will have to be considered on an ad hoc basis to
determine whether there was in fact a substantial interference with the use
and enjoyment of the property beneath, or whether the suit is mere harassment
to "retaliate" for noise which is well above tolerable limits and is one of
"the inconveniences which ... are normally not compensable .... 2o
Evidence-Attorney-Client Privilege Includes Communications to Ac-
countant Employed by Lawyer.-Defendant, an accountant in the employ
of a law firm, was subpoenaed by a grand jury investigating a client's alleged
income tax violations, and was ordered to testify as to his knowledge of the
client's finances. The defendant refused to answer several questions on the
37. 60 Stat. 177 (1946), 49 U.S.C. § 1112(2) (1953). The act providea further in § 1112
that: "A project cost shall be allowable if-(1) it was a necessary cost incurred in ac-
complishing airport development in comformity with approved plans . .. (2) it was
incurred subsequent to the execution of the grant agreement with respect to the project
... (3) it is reasonable in amount, in the opinion of the Administrator... . Federal
Airport Act § 1112, 60 Stat. 117 (1946), 49 U.S.C. § 1112 (195S3).
33. "Upon approving a project the Administrator, on behalf of the United Stat., shall
transmit to the sponsor or sponsors of the project an offer to pay the United States
share of the allowable project costs of such project. . . . Each such offer shall c-tate a
definite amount as the maximum obligation of the United States payable from funds
authorized by this chapter. . . . [Once accepted] thereafter the amount stated in the
accepted offer as the maximum obligation of the United States under such grant agreement
shall not be increased by more than 10 per centum .... " Federal Airport Act § 1111, do
Stat. 177 (1946), as amended, 72 Stat. 307 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1111 (1953).
39. 369 U.S. at S9.
40. United States v. Causby, 323 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
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ground that the requested information had been acquired by him while in the
employ of attorneys, and was therefore privileged. Asserting that the attorney-
client privilege is reserved only to the attorney and those in his office em-
ployed at menial and ministerial work, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York found the defendant guilty of contempt.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a unanimous
decision, held that the attorney-client privilege included communications made
in confidence by a client to an accountant in the attorney's employ for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice from the attorney. The judgment of the
district court was vacated, and the cause remanded for further hearings to
determine the circumstances under which the accountant had received the
information.' United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
The privilege which protects the client from the disclosure by his attorney
of any communication made in the course of the attorney's professional em-
ployment has long been recognized at the common law.2 The primary purpose
of such immunity is to foster freedom of consultation for the client without
fear of compulsory disclosure by the attorney, 3 his clerks, or staff.4 Professor
Wigmore states that the assistance of special agents has become indispensable
to the attorney, and since the communications of the client are often neces-
sarily committed to them by the attorney or by the client himself, the priv-
ilege must extend to all persons acting in the attorney's behalf.5 The com-
plexities of the modern business world have created an ever growing need for
specialists capable of assisting the legal practitioner. Without such cooperative
intercourse, the attorney-client relationship would be handicapped because of
the advent of "field specialization."8
The rule in Great Britain has traditionally been that an accountant con-
sulted by a solicitor, in respect to a client's financial situation, is included in
the privilege.7 As the court stated in Walsham v. Stainton,8 "I can see no dis-
tinction in principle between accounts prepared by an accountant employed
by a solicitor and those prepared by the solicitor himself. It is the case of
a solicitor employing a confidential agent."9
1. Defendant had admitted receiving a statement of the client's assets and liabilities, but
when asked "'what was the purpose of your receiving that,' [he] . . .declined to answer
on the ground of privilege 'because the communication was received with a purpose, as
stated by the client.'" 296 F.2d 918, 919 (2d Cir. 1961).
2. Richardson, Evidence § 426 (8th ed. 1955).
3. People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct.
1934).
4. Including secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet ad-
mitted to the bar, and other aides.
5. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2301 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 369 (1928).
6. Lourie & Cutler, Lawyer's Engagement of Accountant in a Federal Tax Fraud
Case, 10 Tax. L. Rev. 227 (1954).
7. Westminster Airways Ltd. v. Kuwait Oil Co., [1951] 1 K.B. 134; Ankin v. London
& N.E. Ry., [1930] 1 K.B. 527; Walsham v. Stainton, 2 Hem. & M. 1, 71 Eng. Rep. 357
(Ch. 1963).
8. 2 Hem. & M. 1, 71 Eng. Rep. 357 (Ch. 1863).
9. Id at 6, 71 Eng. Rep. at 359.
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In the United States, the attorney-client privilege has been held to include
the employment as consultants, by attorneys, of engineers, 10 patent experts,
interpreters,' medical doctors,13 and psychiatrists.1 4 This result has been
achieved by a liberal interpretation of the privilege's applicability to non-
attorneys. For example, in Sclunitt v. Emery,'5 the court expressed the rule
thusly:
Where a document is prepared by an agent or employe [sic] by direction of the
employer [the client] for the purpose of obtaining the advice of the attorney or for
use in prospective or pending litigation, such document is in effect a communication
between attorney and client. The client is entitled to the same privilege with respect
to such a communication as one prepared by himself. The agent or employc [sic]
as well as the attorney is prohibited from testifying vith respect thereto without the
client's consent.10
In City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court,17 the court held that the
attorney-client privilege included a physician who examined the plaintiff at
the request of the attorney, on the theory that the doctor was an "intermediate
agent for communication between [the plaintiff] ... and his attorneys .... "18
Similarly, the attorney-client privilege has been applied to a psychiatrist
hired by a defendant's lawyer to examine his client in order to ascertain
whether or not a defense of insanity might be utilized upon the defendant's
trial for murder.19 Reasoning that the privilege was based upon the relation
of attorney-client, in that the doctor was the consultant of the attorney, the
court stated that "the privilege extends to the necessary intermediaries and
agents through whom the communications are made. And it includes com-
munications between the attorney and a scientific expert retained to aid in
the presentation of the defense, a confidential employment."'
However, the courts have been cautious and deliberate in further extending
10. Schuyler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. III (M.D. Pa.), motion for new
trial denied, 94 F. Supp. 472 (M.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd per curiam, ISS F.2d 963 (3d Cir.
1951); Lewis v. United Airlines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940); Wilon
v. Superior Court, 14S Cal. 2d 433, 307 P.2d 37 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
11. Lalance & Grosjean Mlfg. Co. v. Haberman Mlfg. Co., S7 Fed. 563 (C.C.SD.N.Y.
1898); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 694 (D. Mass.
1947), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th
Cir. 1948).
12. Du Barre v. Livette, 1 Pea. 10S, 170 Eng. Rep. 96 (K.B. 1791).
13. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26
(1951).
14. State v. Kodolek, 23 NJ. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957).
15. 211 Alinn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942).
16. Id. at 551, 2 N.W.2d at 416.
17. 37 Cal. App. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
IS. Id. at 231, 231 P.2d at 29; accord, Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 635 (9th Cir.
1960), holding that the attorney-client privilege can often e.dst although the communica-
tions are by the client's agents, not the client, to the attorney.
19. State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957).
20. Id. at 413, 129 A.2d at 424.
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the privilege. Thus, in Himmelfarb v. United States,2' the court found no
privilege where an accountant employed by the appellant's attorney was present
during discussions between the attorney and client. The court reasoned that
the accountant's presence at the discussions was not "indispensable in the
sense that the presence of an attorney's secretary may be. It was a convenience
which . . . served to remove the privileged character of whatever communica-
tions were made."2' The client had revealed the information for the purpose
of transmission to an Internal Revenue agent, and therefore the court noted
that the necessary element of confidentiality was lacking. That which did not
bind the attorney did not bind the accountant. 23 Similarly, Gariepy v. United
States,24 relying on Himmelfarb, held that there was no privilege where there
was no evidence to show that the accountant was employed by the attorney.Y5
In the instant case, Judge Friendly was careful to point out the necessary,
albeit difficult, distinction which courts must draw between communications
made by a client to an accountant for accounting advice, and those made to
an accountant at the direction of his attorney for the purpose of securing better
legal advice.20 The court noted that as taxes and tax regulations have increased
in occurrence, amount, and complexity, the assistance of an accountant has
become a practical necessity to the attorney in the latter's attempt to give his
client accurate counsel. The court aptly compared the situation to one where
the client speaks in a foreign language. The attorney would be unable to aid
his client without the services of an interpreter.2 7 Whether provided by the
client or the attorney, and whether or not the conversation occurred in the
presence of the lawyer, the information confidentially given by the client to
the linguist for transmission to the lawyer would be privileged.
The court, in passing,28 pointed out that it was not bound to apply the
New York statutory privilege 29 in a federal grand jury proceeding,80 since,
clearly, it would not be applicable in a federal criminal trial. Noting that the
New York statute and the federal rule were both codifications of the common
21. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
22. Id. at 939.
23. Ibid.
24. 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951). The client confided in his accountant first, and
later revealed the same information to his attorney.
25. Consistent with the Gariepy case is Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d
570 (6th Cir. 1948) (per curiam), affirming Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947). Where the attorney is an accountant, and is acting
only as an accountant, there is no privilege. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1954). Once the attorney steps outside his professional capacity, no privilege attaches. United
States v. De Vasto, 52 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D.
433 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
26. 296 F.2d at 922.
27. Id. at 921.
28. Id. at 921 n.2.
29. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 353.
30. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.
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law, the court dismissed a possible conffict of laws situation as academic be-
cause the result in the instant case, under either rule, would be the same.
A survey of New York case law on the application of the attorney-client
privilege to third persons would tend to justify the court's assumption. The
New York courts have extended the privilege to communications made by an
agent, provided it can be proved that the agent was the authorized agent of
the client for the purpose of making a communication to the attorney.3 ' On
this basis it has been held that the communications of a party to his insurance
company for transmission to its attorney who will defend the insured party,
are privileged3 2 The appellate division, in a dictum, has suggested that Sec-
tion 353 of the New York Civil Practice Act might apply to some or all of the
client's personal records and work sheets while in the hands of an accountanL-3
Clearly the court did not intend, nor grant, the privilege to everyone em-
ployed in a law office. The case was remanded rather than reversed for the
very reason that the record was not clear as to lww the defendant had acquired
the information desired by the grand jury. In the words of the court: "What
is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer. If what is sought is
not legal advice but only accounting service ... or if the advice sought is the
accountant's rather than the lawyer's, no privilege exists" 34 The ruling of this
court sets forth an entirely reasonable standard which, while it expands the
privilege's coverage, encompasses the court's recognition that modern accom-
modations must be brought within the spirit of antedated legal principles.
Injunctions-Sale of Rebottled Trade-Mlarked Product Under Full Dis-
closure Labels Enjoinable.-Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation importing
perfumes and perfume extracts from France which it sells under brand names,
sought an injunction and damages in New York County Supreme Court,
alleging that defendant, in violation of Section 2354(6) of the New York
Penal Law, had purchased and rebottled the perfumes, and had resold
them under labels indicating that the contents were plaintiff's product re-
bottled from the original containers by defendants. The trial court denied
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint as failing to state a cause of action.'
The appellate division reversed, finding no violation of the statute in the
absence of a showing of fraud.2 In a five to two decision the court of appeals,
31. Le Long v. Siebrecht, 196 App. Div. 74, 137 N.Y. Supp. 150 (2d Dep' 1921).
32. Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Mic. S21, 37 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. CL 1949).
33. In re Ryan, 281 App. Div. 953, 120 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't) (per curiam), appeal
dismissed, 306 N.TY. 11, 114 N.E.2d 183 (1953).
34. 296 F.2d at 922.
1. The decision in the New York Supreme Court, Special Term (Steuer, J.) was un-
reported.
2. Lamin Parfums, Inc. v. Le Dans, Ltd., 12 App. Div. 2d 104, 203 N.Y.S.2d 675
(lst Dep't 1960).
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in turn, reversed the appellate division.3 Section 2354(6) 4 was intended to
prevent the possibility of fraud and the mere acknowledgment of the repack-
aging upon the label did not lessen that possibility. Because defendants' alleged
conduct also threatened property rights, trade-mark, and good will of the
plaintiff, an injunction would issue. Lanvin Parfums, Inc. v. Le Dans, Ltd., 9
N.Y.2d 516, 174 N.E.2d 920, 215 N.Y.S.2d 257, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 834
(1961).
Equity has extended its protection of property rights5 to business activities
through the law of unfair competition.0 Originally an infringement of a trade-
mark would be enjoined only where defendant was a competitor 7 and had
"palmed off" his product as plaintiff's.8 As business activities increased and
3. The dissenting judges of the court of appeals voted to affirm on the basis of the
majority opinion of the appellate division.
4. N.Y. Penal Law § 2354 provides: "A person who . . . (6) Knowingly sells, offers or
exposes for sale, any goods which are represented in any manner, by word or deed, to be
the manufacture, packing, bottling, boxing or product of any person, firm or corporation,
other than himself, unless such goods are contained in the original packages, box or
bottle and under the labels, marks or names placed thereon by the manufacturer who Is
entitled to use such marks, names, brands, or trade-marks; . . . is guilty of a mis-
demeanor .... "
5. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
6. De Funiak, Modem Equity § 38 (1950). "Trade-mark infringement rests on a
relatively narrow principle while the law of unfair competition is a broad concept with
a widening scope. Trade-mark infringement is a phase of unfair competition, while unfair
competition may exist independently of trade-mark infringement." 1 Nims, The Law of
Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks § 1, at 13 (4th ed. 1947); cf. Guerlain, Inc. v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 297 N.Y. 11, 74 N.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947).
7. "The phrase 'unfair competition' presupposes competition of some sort. In the
absence of competition the doctrine cannot be invoked." Borden Ice Cream Co. v.
Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912). The requirement of
competition between the parties was later rejected. See Standard Oil Co. of N.M. v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1932), where it was stated: "ET1be
Borden case is out of harmony with the modem law of unfair competition." Ward Baking
Co. v. Potter-Wrightington Inc., 298 Fed. 398 (1st Cir. 1924); Long's Hat Stores Corp.
v. Long's Clothes, Inc., 224 App. Div. 497, 231 N.Y. Supp. 107 (1st Dep't 1928). See also
Note, 24 Ind. LJ. 575 (1949).
8. "During the early years of the development of the doctrine of unfair competition,
standards of commercial morality were comparatively low, and the efforts of an able
bench and a vigorous bar were largely confined to securing relief where one trader passed
off his goods as those of his rival. Thus 'passing or palming off' became the criterion and
test to determine whether or not the defendant was guilty of unfair competition." Oates,
Relief in Equity Against Unfair Trade Practices of Non-Competitors, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 643,
644 (1931); see Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 405 (1916). In Howe
Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118, 140 (1905) the Court stated that
"the essence of the wrong in unfair competition consists in the sale of the goods of one
manufacturer or vendor for those of another, and if defendant so conducts its business as
not to palm off its goods as those of complainant, the action fails." See Goodyear's India
Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 604 (1888) where the Court
said: "Relief in such cases is granted only where the defendant, by his marks, signs, labels,
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more subtle methods of unfairness evolved, courts of equity correspondingly
extended their protection to "any species of 'commercial hitch-hiking.' "3
No longer was an actual intent to deceive or mislead the public necessary;10
nor might a defendant answer that he was using his own name in the conduct
of his business, if the result was an appropriation of another's reputation."
The standard has come to be whether acts are or are not unfair,'- as deter-
mined by the individual character and circumstances of the business r 3
so that "appropriation of that which equitably belongs to a competitor"' 4
can be restrained by injunction. The rights incidental to a trade-mark are
acquired at common law by its exclusive use and appropriation and exist
independently of registration under any trade-mark act.5 It is generally agreed
that a trade-mark, of itself, confers a property right upon its owner,10
or in other vys, represents to the public that the goods sold by him are those manufactured
or produced by the plaintiff, thus palming off his goods... 21 Cf. White Studio, Inc. v.
Dreyfoos, 221 N.Y. 46, 116 N.E. 796 (1917).
9. Harvey Machine Co. N. Harvey Aluminum Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 1078, 101 175 N.Y.S.2d
2SS, 291 (Sup. Ct. 1957). The historical development of this branch of the law is vell
traced by Justice Greenberg in both Christian Dior, S.R.L. v. Milton, 9 lc. 2d 42s, 155
N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 2 App. Di% 2d S78, 156 N.YS.2d 996 (1st Dep't 1956),
and Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 7M6, 101
N.Y.S.2d 4S3 (Sup. CL 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951)
(per curiam). See also Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 427
(N.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), c rt, denied, 362
U.S. 919 (1960); Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. United Whelan Corp., 22 Misc. 2d 532, 197
N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d
332 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
10. Chas. S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N.Y. 462, 39 N.E. 490 (1395);
Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S2d
845 (1st Dep't 1933). See also Derenberg, Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair Trading
§ 6, at 55 (1936).
11. See Sullivan v. Ed Sullivan Radio & T.V., Inc., I App. Div. 2d 6G9, 152 N.Y.S.2d
227 (1st Dep't 1956); Annot., 107 A.L.R. 1279 (1937), supplementing 47 A.L.R. 11S9
(1927).
12. Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App. Div. 323, 122 N.Y.S.2d 433 (3d
Dep't 1953).
13. W. Walley, Inc. v. Saks & Co., 266 App. Div. 193, 41 N.YS.2d 739 (1st Dep't 1943).
14. Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 427, 432 (N.D.N.Y.
1958), citing International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 243 US. 215 (1913). See also
AL.A. Scheehter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 US. 495 (1935).
15. E. F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1943);
2 Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks § 223a (4th ed. 1947). See
also Trade-'Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 32 (1879). "The right to adopt and use a symbol or a
device to distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person vhose mark it is,
to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized by the common law
and the chancery courts of England and of this country, and by the statutes of some of
the States. It is a property right for the violation of which damages may be recovered
in an action at law, and the continued violation of it will be enjoined by a court of equity,
with compensation for past infringement." Id. at 92.
16. See 1 Ninis, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks § 192a, at 530 (4th
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but good will, of which a trade-mark is only the symbol,' 7 has long been the
subject of protection as a property right in New York courts.1 8 New York
has gone so far as to hold that "any civil right not unlawful in itself nor
against public policy, that has acquired a pecuniary value, becomes a property
right that is entitled to protection as such."' 9
As a supplement to common-law protection there are state and federal
registration statutes. Registration has many advantages but it is not manda-
tory and a failure to register forfeits no rights existing at common law.20
The federal Lanham Act of 194621 affords the registrant the benefits of con-
structive notice of the existence of the owner's mark2 and provides a federal
forum 23 for the remedies24 enumerated under the act, regardless of diversity
of citizenship or the amount in controversy. New York has also provided for
trade-mark protection through registration, 5 through remedies2 0 in its General
ed. 1947) and cases cited therein; cf. Derenberg, Trade-Mark Protection and Unfair
Trading 47 (1936).
17. 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 16, § 16.
18. "The plaintiffs were thereby subjected to unfair competition by a rival; to an In-
vasion of the good will acquired by them for the trade name." Lehrenkrauss v. Universal
Tours, Inc., 262 N.Y. 332, 337, 186 N.E. 802, 803 (1933); "The plaintiff dearly had a
property right in its good name, its reputation, its good will built up at considerable ex-
pense. . . ." Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 App. Div. 459,
466, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845, 851 (1st Dep't 1938); "EP]laintiff has incurred great expense, has
acquired a reputation and good will of value and has acquired valuable property rights
in its good will and reputation .... " Christian Dior, S.R.L. v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d at 428, 155
N.Y.S.2d at 449.
19. Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 428, 132 N.E. 133, 137, cert. denied, 257 U.S.
654 (1921). The Fisher case followed International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918).
20. "In the United States, the statutes, both Federal and local, involving trade-marks
have been registration statutes granting no rights not recognized under common law."
2 Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 1116 (4th ed. 1947). See
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938).
21. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1958). "The purpose of this bill Is
to place all matters relating to trade-marks in one statute and to eliminate judicial
obscurity, to simplify registration and to make it stronger and more liberal, to dispense
with mere technical prohibitions and arbitrary provisions, to make procedure simple, and
relief against infringement prompt and effective." S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1946). Prior to the present Lanham Act, Congress had enacted major trade-mark
legislation in 33 Stat. 724 (1905) and 41 Stat. 533 (1920).
22. 60 Stat. 435 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1958).
23. 60 Stat. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1958).
24. 60 Stat. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1958). "Under the new Act ... a yardstick
is available for uniform determination of what constitutes 'unfair competition.' Somewhat
indirectly, but nevertheless effectively, a Federal 'code of unfair competition' is thus incor-
porated into our law. . . ." Roberts, The New Trade-Mark Manual 180 (1947).
25. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 363.
26. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-c to 68-d. When the instant case arose, the remedies
section was contained entirely in § 368-c. At that time, subdivision 3 of § 368-c read:
"Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
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Business Law,27 and by provisions in its Penal LavF3 which designate
certain conduct as misdemeanors.29 These penal sanctions are not exclusive of
the equitable remedies30 and the fact that the acts sought to be enjoined are
also criminal will not, of itself, preclude an injunction,3 ' although a crime
as such would not be enjoinable.3 2
Prior to the decision in Erie R.R. v. Towpkins,33 the United States Supreme
trade name or trade-mark schall be a ground for injunctive relief in cascs of trade-mark
infringement or unfair competition, notwithstanding the abscnce of competition betwcn the
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services." The court, in
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 353 at 366 (2d Cir. 1959), held sub-
division 3 to be applicable only to trade-marks registered under New York law bccause
of language contained in subdivision 1 of § 363-c which refers to trade-mark counterfeits.
This decision was vitiated by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 53, which deleted subdiviion 3
from § 36S-c and transferred its substance to stand alone in § 36S-d, which in part nor.
reads: "shall be ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registere
or not registered or in cases of unfair competition... 1
27. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law art. 17-A makes it unlawful to deal in empty bottles,
receptacles, etc., when the owner has filed his name, mark, or device used on the containers
to indicate his ownership. See People v. Cannon, 139 N.Y. 32, 34 N.E. 759 (1893). N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law §§ 361, 363-c, provides for registration of trade-marks and remedies
against infringement. See also the New York Fair Trade Law in N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law art. 24-a.
28. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 2350-57.
29. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 2354-56.
30. 2 Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-marks § 373 e, at 1103; (4th
ed. 1947); Matter of Julius Restaurant, Inc. v. Lombardix 232 N.Y. 126, 25 N.E2d 874
(1940).
31. "There must be some interferences, actual or threatened, with property or rights of
a pecuniary nature, but when such interferences appear the jurisdiction of a court of
equity arises, and is not destroyed by the fact that they are accompanied by or are
themselves violations of the criminal law." In re Debs, 15S US. 564, 593 (1395). "If the
interest sought to be protected is one of which equity will take cognizance, it will not
refuse to take jurisdiction on the ground that the act which invades that interet is
punishable by the penal statutes of the State." People ex rel. Bennctt v. Laman, 277 N.Y.
363, 376, 14 N.E.2d 439, 442 (1933). See also People v. Truchce Lumber Co., 116 Ca]. 397,
4S Pac. 374 (1897); Celia v. People, 112 Ili. App. 376 (1904); State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150
Ind. 21, 49 N.E. S09 (1S9S).
32. Clark, Principles of Equity § 244 (1919); De Funiahk, Handbook of Modem
Equity, § 39 (2d ed. 1950); McClintock, Equity § 164 (2d ed. 1943). Public nusances
violative of a criminal statute are enjoinable upon suit by the state. See In re Dcb3, 153
U.S. 564 (1895); People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 363, 14 N.E2d 439 (1933).
Where the nuisance causes special damage to an individual his suit is prort. Cranford
v. Tyrrell, 128 N.Y. 341, 2S N.E. 514 (1891). Similarly, violations of zoning ordinances
can be enjoined where special damage is caused to an individual. See Marcus v'. Village
of Mamaroneck, 283 N.Y. 325, 28 N.E.2d 856 (1940); Bailer v. Ringe, 255 App. Div.
976, 8 N.Y.S.2d 99 (2d Dep't 193S); Kaltenbach v. Benisch, 252 App. Div. 783, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 276 (2d Dep't 1937); Rice v. Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82, 229 N.Y. Supp. 32 (Sup.
Ct. 1928), aft'd, 225 App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y. Supp. 506 (3d Dep't 1929), aff'd without
opinion, 255 N.Y. 541, 175 N.E. 304 (1930).
33. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
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Court, under facts substantially the same as those in the case under considera-
tion, refused to grant an injunction in Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty,84 holding
that a sale after rebottling under an acknowledging label was not an infringe-
ment of plaintiff's federally registered trade-mark. Although the case arose
in New York, the Court's opinion did not mention Section 2354(6) of the New
York Penal Law.35 The leading case construing this section has been People v.
Luhrs,36 which held that section 364(6) (the predecessor of section 2354(6))
made it a crime to sell goods represented to have been made by the owner of a
trade-mark unless such goods were contained in the original package and were
as packaged by the manufacturer under his label. Thus, where defendant refilled
a whiskey bottle, having the Wilson trade-mark and label, with a whiskey of un-
certain origin and then sold the substituted whiskey as Wilson whiskey bottled by
the Wilson company, he violated the act whether or not he refilled the bottle
with Wilson whiskey. Faced then with the question of constitutionality, the
court explained that the statute was a proper exercise of the state's police
power in that it was a reasonable regulation designed to protect the public
from fraud. Luhrs was a criminal prosecution in which no injunction was sought.
Indeed, no case has held subdivision six of section 2354 to be the basis of an
injunction.
The present majority construed the Luhrs violation to consist of rebottling
and reselling "irrespective of an actual fraud"3 7 or misrepresentation on the
part of that defendant. The court found subdivision six designed to prevent
the "possibility of fraud" and to prevent "the rebottler [from] . .. trading
upon the reputation of the owner of the trade-mark."38 Hence, the majority
concluded that the facts of the instant case constituted a violation even though
the labels used by the defendant fully disclosed the rebottling and revealed
by whom it was performed. After dismissing the applicability of Prestonettes,
Inc. v. Coty because it had not been decided under the New York statute, the
34. 264 U.S. 359 (1924). The instant court referred only briefly to the Prestonettes
case: "In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that rebottling and
reselling of perfumes by the defendant, under labels substantially similar to the labels
used by defendants in the case before us, constituted no infringement of plaintiff's
federally registered trade-mark, despite the 'omnipresent possibility of fraud' and the
likelihood of spoilation. But that case was not decided under our statute, and has no
bearing here." 9 N.Y.2d at 522, 174 N.E.2d at 922, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 260. The Prestonettes
decision by Mr. Justice Holmes makes no mention of § 2354(6) despite the fact that It
was raised by the arguments of both petitioner (264 U.S. at 362) and respondent (264 U.S.
at 366). When the case was in the circuit court of appeals, it was said concerning
§ 2354(6): "The injunction should issue not because the defendant is committing a
criminal offence under New York law, but because what it is doing is an actual interference
'with property or rights of a pecuniary nature' which are recognized and protected under
the law of New York . . . [W]e do not think the plaintiff's right rests alone upon the
New York statute, but his right rests upon the general principles of the law of trade-marks."
Coty v. Prestonettes, Inc., 285 Fed. 501, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1922).
35. See note 4 supra.
36. 195 N.Y. 377, 89 N.E. 171 (1909).
37. 9 N.Y.2d at 522, 174 N.E.2d at 922, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
38. Ibid.
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court summarily held that "the alleged criminal acts also threaten plaintiff's
property rights, trade-mark, and good will, and an injunction, therefore, is
available." 39
Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Fuld, dissenting, adopted the opinion of
the appellate division, which had reasoned that statutes were not to be read with
a literalness which would destroy their meaning and purpose. Section 2354(6)
was held to require a showing of fraud to establish its violation. In Lkrvs there
was found to be "a tacit, and false, representation that the whiskey poured
from the Wilson bottle was the same whiskey that had been last placed in that
bottle, without refilling, by the distillers whose label the bottle bore."40 The
appellate division conceded that an injunction would be available to prevent a
crime if the criminal act also damaged or impaired a property right,41 but
concluded that in view of Prestonettes there was here "no property or equiva-
lent right to protect by injunction."42
It is to be noted that all of the subdivisions of section 2354, save sub-
division six, actually require an element of fraud or falsity, and that prior to
1882, the words "with intent to defraud" appeared at the beginning of the
entire section as an over-all specification for each of the subdivisions as they
then read.43 In that year the legislature reworded the section so that each
subdivision contained its own specifications for the crime described." Thus, it
would appear that the construction given by the appellate division and the
instant dissent would be an improper attempt to replace what the legislature re-
moved in 1882. In view of the legislative intent, therefore, the court of appeals
was correct in stating that there were "no sound reasons for departing from a
literal construction of the statute .... ,5 Because plaintiff's suit for injunction
and damages was founded exclusively upon the alleged violation of the New
York Penal Law4" the court was first forced into a statutory construction
and properly held, in favor of a literal interpretation, that no fraud or deception
of the public is necessary to constitute the crime. The appellate division and the
court of appeals were in agreement that no injunction would lie merely to pre-
vent a crime, and also, on the authority of People ex rel. Bennett v. Laan,9-
that criminal acts which threaten property rights of an individual might be
enjoined.48 However, the appellate division, citing Prestonettes, indicated that
on resale, plaintiff, by virtue of his trade-mark, had no such property right to
39. Id. at 523, 174 N.E.2d at 922, 215 N.YS.2d at 261.
40. 12 App. Div. 2d at 10S, 20S N.YS.2d at 679.
41. Id. at 113-14, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
42. Id. at 114, 20S N.Y.S.2d at 6W3.
43. NA.Y. Sess. Laws ISSI, ch. 676.
44. I.Y. Sess. Laws 18S2, ch. 3S4.
45. 9 N.Y.2d at 522, 174 N.E.2d at 922, 215 N.YS..2d at 260.
46. Id. at 520, 174 N.E.2d at 921, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 253; Brief for Plaintiff-Appcilant
p. 2.
47. 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (193S), reversing 250 App. Div. 660, 295 N.Y. Supp.
72S (3d Dep't 1937), a suit to enjoin defendant from practicing medicine vithout a
license.
4S. Notes 31 and 32 supra.
1962]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
be protected. In rejecting this contention the court of appeals explicitly stated
that Prestonettes49 was not decided on the basis of New York law and had no
bearing on the present case.5" It must be borne in mind that, although the
statutory scheme of protection in New York affords a trade-mark owner
greater protection than was available to the Prestonettes plaintiff under
federal law in 1924,51 prior to the instant case it was not clear whether the
New York courts would follow the persuasive authority of Prestonettes and
find that plaintiff had no property right to protect. Cognizant of this, plaintiff
drafted his pleadings strictly on the basis of the penal statute, apparently in
an attempt to remain far removed from the scope of Prestonettes. Such
cautious procedure will probably no longer be necessary as the instant court
clearly held that "the alleged criminal acts also threaten plaintiff's property
rights, trade-mark, and good will, and an injunction, therefore, is available. '5 2
The result is that under New York law a trade-mark owner's protectible prop-
erty interests definitely extend to resale after his product has been repackaged
by another even in the absence of any deception employed in effecting the
resale. At the same time the court also revealed New York's policy of extending
injunctive relief to the protection of good will.5 3 Whether, in the absence of
section 2354(6), the plaintiff would have emerged successful in a suit charging
common-law trade-mark infringement, has been left in doubt by the court.
Considering the ever-increasing scope of protection offered in the general
area of unfair competition, it is quite likely that plaintiff would have been
successful, for as was held in Christian Dior, S.R.L. v. Milton," ' "the effort
to profit from the labor, skill, expenditures, name and reputation of others
.. constitutes unfair competition which will be enjoined."55
Judgments-Res Judicata-Defense Not Available Where Both Plaintiff
and Defendant Found Negligent as Codefendants in Prior Action.-
An automobile owned and operated by plaintiff collided with one
owned by defendant All State Rental Corporation, and operated by defendant
Brenner. After the collision, plaintiff's automobile struck a parked, unoccupied
automobile owned by one Biernoff, who brought suit in negligence against
the owners and operators of both of the moving cars. A judgment holding all
49. The majority of the instant court points out that: "Significantly, the doctrine of
Prestnettes has been severly [sic) criticized by the writers ...and by the lower Federal
courts (e.g., Bourjois, Inc. v. Hermida Labs., 106 F.2d 174 [3d Cir., 1939)]. Thus, in
Bourjois, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals said: 'In that case [Prestonettes]
Mr. Justice Holmes lent the prestige of his great name to a doctrine that does not appeal
very greatly to the sense of fairness of the ordinary man.'" 9 N.Y.2d at 523, 174 N.E.2d
at 922, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 260-61.
50. 9 N.Y.2d at 522, 174 N.E.2d at 922, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
51. I.e., Trade Mark Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 724, and Trade Mark Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 533.
52. 9 N.Y.2d at 523, 174 N.E.2d at 922, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
53. Note 18 supra.
54. 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
55. Id. at 435, 155 N.Y.S.2d 455.
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the parties of the instant case negligent was entered in Biernoff's favor. Plain-
tiff then instituted this suit for damages caused to him by defendants' negli-
gence. Defendants moved to amend their answers to plead the judgment obtained
by Biernoff as res judicata on the issue of plaintiff's negligence. The appellate
division1 affirmed the order of the appellate term denying defendants' motion.
The court of appeals held that the defense of res judicata was not available.
Minkoff v. Brewner, 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E.2d 434, 225 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1962)
(memorandum decision).
The common-law doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of adjudicated
issues; an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction binds the parties and their privies in any future
actions on issues litigated in the first suit, or which might have been
litigated therein s If an action proceeds to final judgment the plaintiff's cause
of action is said to have been "merged" in the judgment if he wins, or "barred"
should he lose.3 Collateral estoppel results when the former adjudication was
between the same parties but did not involve the same cause of action. The
only issues conclusively determined under collateral estoppel are those which
have been actually litigated, and the test as to whether issues might have been
litigated is not applied.4 But the question "of what constitutes the 'same' or
'different' causes of action is not a matter free from difficulty."3 In De Coss v.
Thrnzer & Blanchard, Inc.,6 plaintiff, who had lost a negligence action in a
federal court and subsequently sued in New York to recover damages for the
same injury but upon different allegations of negligence, was held to be barred
from a second suit. Judge Lehman applied the following definition:
A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right
which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish
more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be considered
severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal vrong.7
The court of appeals was again asked to determine whether suits were based
upon similar or dissimilar causes of action in Smith v. Kirkpatric..s There,
plaintiff sought recovery of monies due upon an alleged contract. The agree-
ment was found to be without the Statute of Frauds and summary judgment
for defendant was granted, with leave for plaintiff to amend his complaint.
1. Minkoff v. Brenner, 13 App. Div. 2d 3 (2d Dep't 1961) (memorandum detion).
2. Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 17, 9 N.E.2d 753s 759 (1937);
Schuykill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E. 456 (1929).
3. Restatement, Judgments §§ 47-4S (1942).
4. Statter v. Statter, 2 App. Div. 2d 81, 153 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Ist Dep't 1956).
5. Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 70, 111 N.E.2d 209, 211 (1953).
6. 267 N.Y. 207, 196 N.E. 2S (1935).
7. Id. at 211, 196 N.E. at 30. The court quoted from Baltimore SS. Co. v. Phillips,
274 U.S. 316 (1927). "In dealing with this problem, the great majority of courts, regard-
ing the wrongful act as the basis of the cause of action, hold that all damages which
are to be obtained must be recovered in a single suit, and when that is determined the
cause of action is res judicata." Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 3S Yale LJ. 299, 313 (1929).
S. 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 (1953).
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Thereafter, plaintiff amended his complaint to set forth two causes of action,
both demanding an accounting. The first alleged an informal oral agreement
between the parties; the second, an oral agreement of joint venture. Judgment
was directed in favor of defendant on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to
establish either cause of action. Plaintiff took no appeal and subsequently sued
in quantum meruit. The court held that the "causes of action are different
and distinct and the rights and interests established by the previous adjudica-
tion will not be impaired by a recovery ... in quantum meruit."O
Collateral estoppel also demands compliance with the tests of privity and of
mutuality of estoppel.' 0 The Restatement definition of privity corresponds to
that generally approved by the courts:" "The word 'privy' includes those
who control an action although not parties to it . .. , those whose interests
are represented by a party to the action..., [and] successors in interest .... ,,12
In these situations persons not parties of record are held to be so closely
related to the parties as to be affected by the judgment.Y' The mutuality require-
ment bars strangers from obtaining the benefits of a judgment if they are not
bound by it.' 4 Exceptions to the rule of mutuality have "been held to exist
where the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability
of the one exonerated in a prior suit. . ... 15 Where "the relation between the
defendants in the two suits has been that of principal and agent, master and
servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee"'16 the rule of mutuality has been relaxed.
The facts in Glaser v. Huette'7 were strikingly similar to those of the instant
case. Plaintiff and defendant collided and a third person was injured. The
third person sued the plaintiff and defendant for damages and both were held
negligent in the operation of their automobiles. Subsequently, plaintiff sued
defendant in negligence and defendant sought to assert the defense of res
judicata claiming that plaintiff had been found negligent in the prior suit.
The court of appeals affirmed the appellate division holding that "since the
parties .. .were not adversaries in the former suits but codefendants wherein
no duty existed to contest the issue of negligence as between them and no
pleadings existed between them, the decisions there settled nothing as to the
liability of the codefendants to each other. Therefore, the plea of res adjudicata
9. Id. at 72, 111 N.E.2d at 212.
10. Elder v. New York & Penn. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940).
See also 1 Freeman, Judgments § 407 (5th ed. 1925).
11. Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316 (1945); United States v. Dollar, 100
F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
12. Restatement, Judgments § 83, comment a (1942).
13. Romeo v. Western Express Co., 45 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
14. Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1949); 1 Freeman, Judgments
§ 428 (5th ed. 1925).
15. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912).
16. Id. at 128. See also Fish v. Vanderlip, 218 N.Y. 29, 112 N.E. 425 (1916); Pangburn
v. Buick Motor Co., 211 N.Y. 228, 105 N.E. 423 (1914).
17. 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y. Supp. 374 (1st Dep't), affd mem., 256 N.Y. 686, 177
N.E. 193 (1931).
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[sic] was not available to this defendant. s18 Decisions since Glazscr, however,
have undermined the requirement of mutuality9 on the ground that rigid ad-
herence to it tends to defeat the underlying policy of res judicata, i.e., that "there
be an end to litigation."20 The emphasis has come to be upon the question of
whether a party has had his day in court on an issue, rather than on whether
he has been heard on that issue against a particular party. In Good Health
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery,21 defendant's car, driven by her son with
her consent, collided with plaintiff-dairy corporation's truck. The son had
already sued and recovered from the corporation and the driver. In this
action plaintiffs, corporation and driver, sought damages from defendant as
owner of the automobile. The previous judgment against the plaintiffs was
held a bar to the suit against the defendant, thus allowing a stranger to the
prior action to assert the defense of res judicata to the issue of plaintiffs' negli-
gence, since "the plaintiffs. . . had a full opportunity to litigate the issue of
liability.. .22 in the prior action.
In Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.) 3 plaintiff alleged two separate causes of
action, the first against defendant Wood Dolson for breach of contract and
the second against one Gross for knowingly inducing Wood Dolson to breach
the contract. Upon plaintiff's motion the two actions were severed; in the first
the court held that there had been no breach of contract. Gross, defending the
action for inducing the contract's breach, then amended his answer to plead
the affirmative defense of res judicata and moved for summary judgment. In
affirming the appellate division which had granted the motion, the court of
appeals held that the liability of Wood Dolson and Gross turned upon the
single issue of whether there had been a breach of contract. The court reasoned
18. Id. at 119, 249 N.Y. Supp. at 375. "In the cases in the Municipal Court the precise
matters in issue were the negligence of this plaintiff and this defendant, and tho:e issues
were necessarily determined. The jury there decided that all the parties hereto were negli-
gent. They had ample opportunity there to submit evidence and to definitely place the
responsibility for the accident. The codefendants therein, having litigated the quection of
negligence, and having been found negligent, the judgment entered in the Mlunicipal Court
is a final adjudication on the issue of negligence and this plaintiff is not now in a position
to relitigate that question. Codefendants who are adversaries in an action in which a
judgment is rendered are such parties to the judgment as are bound thereby where the
question at issue in the case is litigated and determined between the codefendants in the
former action .... We are not here concerned with the degree of negligence which may
be charged to each of the defendants in the Municipal Court action. The fact that both
were held negligent and were charged with equal responsibility for the accident, disposes
of that issue since there has been no reversal on appeal .... I am of the opinion, therefore,
that the defense of res adjudicata [sic] may be pleaded herein and that the order denying
leave to amend the answer should be reversed, and the motion granted." Id. at 121, 249
N.Y. Supp. at 376-77 (dissenting opinion).
19. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956);
Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 753 (1937).
20. 1 N.Y.2d at 120, 134 N.E.2d at 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
21. 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 75S (1937).
22. Id. at 19, 9 N.E.2d at 759.
23. 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
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that a stranger to the first action could assert the defense of res judicata
where the issues litigated in the prior action were identical to those to be
determined in the second suit. The court held that "Israel has had a full
opportunity to prove such breach in his suit against Wood Dolson in a court
of competent jurisdiction. That court has found no breach and . . . plaintiff
may not relitigate that issue."24 Israel added, however, that "our holding here
is not to be treated as adding another general class of cases to the list of
'exceptions' to the rule requiring mutuality of estoppel. It is merely the an-
nouncement of the underlying principle which is found in the cases classed as
'exceptions' to the mutuality rule."25
While Glaser has never been expressly overruled, Israel caused ambiguity
in the law of New York. Some lower courts26 have refused to disregard Glaser,
holding, as in Friedman v. Salvati, 7 that Israel "did not change the rule an-
nounced in Glaser v. Huette"28 and that "until Glaser v. Huelte has been
specifically overturned by the court of appeals, the doctrine of that case will
be applied .... ,,29 Several other lower courts, however, have followed Good
Health and Israel, at least where the estoppel has been used only defensively. 0
The present case presented the Glaser situation again. An injured party
sued the drivers and owners of two automobiles as codefendants, for damages
due to the negligent operation of their automobiles. After the plaintiff in that
action obtained judgment, one of the codefendants sued the other for damages
for injuries sustained in the accident and the defendant sought to assert the
defense of res judicata claiming that the prior action had precluded litigation
of the issue of this plaintiff's negligence and that thus the issue of this plain-
tiff's contributory negligence had already been tried. Defendant's argued that
Israel had in effect overruled Glaser. The court, in holding that that defense
was not available, followed Glaser, refusing to overrule Israel. The court wrote
24. Id. at 120, 134 N.E.2d at 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
25. Ibid.
26. Grande v. Torello, 12 App. Div. 2d 937, 210 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dep't 1961) (memo-
randum decision); Friedman v. Salvati, 11 App. Div. 2d 104, 201 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Ist Dep't
1960); Ordway v. White, 25 Misc. 2d 633, 204 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Corey v.
Central Taxi, 199 Misc. 403, 106 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Boyne v. Samac Motors,
22 Misc. 2d 686, 91 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
27. 11 App. Div. 2d 104, 201 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dep't 1960). This was an action to
recover damages resulting from a collision with a vehicle driven by the defendant. Held,
that a judgment against the present plaintiff and defendant in a prior action by a passenger
in defendant's car, was not res judicata, because plaintiff and defendant herein were not
adversaries in the prior action.
28. Id. at 105, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
29. Id. at 106, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
30. Bennett v. Mitchell, 2 Misc. 2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Moyle v.
Cronin, 18 Misc. 2d 465, 189 N.Y.S.2d 96 (County Ct. 1959); Light v. Quinn, 17 Misc.
2d 1083, 189 N.Y.S.2d 94 (County Ct. 1959); James v. Saul, 17 Misc. 2d 371, 184 N.Y.S.2d
934 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1958); Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc. 2d 994, 157 N.Y.S.2d 684
(N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1956).
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no opinion, thus leaving Israel an anomaly and denying the bar any definite
means of distinguishing Israel from the instant facts.
In the Israel situation there were three parties and a contract; the first
Israel decision held that the contract had not been breached. In the instant
situation there were three parties and one accident; the first decision holding
that two of the parties negligently caused injury to the third. In both situa-
tions there is a relationship of sorts between all of the parties and, if anything,
the relationship in the present case would appear stronger. Of the two
cases it would appear more logical to allow the defense of res judicata here
rather than in Israel because here the first trial involved all three of the
parties whereas the first Israel action involved only two of the three. It must be
noted, however, that there is a possible, if somewhat tenuous, distinction that
may be drawn between the two cases. In Israel the plaintiff originally brought
a single suit against two defendants. The causes of action were subsequently
severed, upon the motion of plaintiff, and the actions proceeded to judgment
via separate trials. On the other hand, in Glaser and in the instant case no
attempt was made by the defendants in the first action to cross-claim against
each other. Glaser found this lack of cross pleadings pertinent. ' In both
cases the party who failed to take affirmative steps to limit the number of
actions was hurt by application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The
court may be requiring parties who wish to assert the defense of res judicata
to have taken all means possible to avert multiplicity of suits. Under this
rationale, had defendants in the present action cross-claimed against each other
and the court then ordered separate trials of their claims, a motion to assert
the defense of res judicata might have been allowed under Israel. Similarly, if
in Israel the motion to sever had been made, not by plaintiff but by defendant,
defendant's motion to amend to enter a defense of res judicata might have
been denied. But this is by no means certain.
A more convincing reconciliation of Israel and the instant decision may be
made, however, by considering the determining question in both cases to have
been whether the issues in the cases were the same, rather than whether all the
parties to the second action had been heard. Israel held that the issue of the exist-
ence of a contract had been litigated and was hence res judicata. It is possible
that Glaser and the instant court refused to allow the defense of res judicata be-
cause there was no determination in the first action of the issue of whether the one
defendant (plaintiff in the second action) had been negligent as to the other
defendant.32 The lack of an accompanying opinion in the present case is un-
fortunate in view of the difficulty in distinguishing Israel. No clear reason
31. 232 App. Div. at 119, 249 N.Y. Supp. at 342.
32. It is possible that the finding of joint liability in the first Minkoff action was founded
upon facts similar to the following. Car A might negligently have collided with car B and
car B, due to faulty brakes, might have been unable to stop and the collision with C rezulted.
Both A and B would be liable to C. B, however, would have a cause of action in negligence
aginst A for the injury caused by the original collision; A would not be able to ascert
that B had been held contributorily negligent. We do not Imow, however, the facts of
the accident in Minkoff.
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exists why the Israel rationale should not have applied to the present situation
and the court have found an identity of issues. As it stands Glaser is affirmed
and Israel remains the law. Where before, doubt was cast upon the validity of
Glaser, uncertainty must now surround Israel.
Labor Law-Jurisdictional Standards of the National Labor Relations
Board.-Respondent was ordered by the National Labor Relations Board to
cease and desist from committing unfair labor practices in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act.' The Board had assumed jurisdiction of the
matter since respondent's gross volume of business exceeded the Board's juris-
dictional minimum of $500,0002 and it purchased products from storage within
the state whose origin was without the state.8 After respondent's refusal to
obey the order, the Board, pursuant to Section 10(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act,4 petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit for its enforcement. The court held that the Board's findings on the
merits were "adequately supported by substantial evidence"r5 but denied en-
forcement of the order and remanded the case to the NLRB "with instructions
to take further evidence and make further findings on the manner in which a
labor dispute [respondent] . . . affects or tends to affect commerce." NLRB
v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 297 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1961).
Shortly after the decision in Reliance, but before rehearing was denied, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reached the same con-
clusion in NLRB v. Benevento.6 With the same question before it,7 the court
remanded the case to the Board to make "clear findings of fact based upon
legally sufficient evidence ... to support its assertion of jurisdiction."
The Wagner Act of 19359 grants jurisdiction to the NLRB over all employers
engaged in interstate commerce or whose businesses affect interstate commerce.
Section 2 (7) of the act defines the term "affecting commerce" as:
1. Specifically, §§ 8(a)(1)-(a)(3),(a)(5) of the act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(a)(3),(a)(5) (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
2. The Board's current standard for retail concerns is a gross yearly revenue of over
$500,000. See NLRB Press Release No. 576, Oct. 2, 1958, 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1958).
3. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 297 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961). Respondent also had
purchased truck parts valued at no more than a few hundred dollars from out of
state. However, as the Board did not rest its jurisdiction on this, the court did not
consider it. Id. at 95 n.1.
4. 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958).
5. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 297 F.2d at 96.
6. 297 F.2d 873 (1st Cir. 1961).
7. In Benevento, the Board applied its current $50,000 outflow or inflow standard for
nonretail concerns. See NLRB Press Release No. 576, Oct. 2, 1958, 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1958).
8. 297 F.2d at 876.
9. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958). This
was subsequently amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958) and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. II, 1959-1960), so that
the composite is the present federal law in the field of labor relations.
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in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce,
or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing com-
merce or the free flow of commerce.10
It has been said that this grant of jurisdiction goes to the full extent of Con-
gress' constitutional power 1" to prevent obstructions to interstate and foreign
commerce' 2 and that ultimately there is no business which is not subject to
the act.13
The constitutionality of the Wagner Act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,'4 where the Supreme Court acquiesced in the Board's
ad hoc method of asserting jurisdiction.'; In Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB,'0 the Court again approved the Board's ad hoc method 17 of asserting
jurisdiction. The Court, however, did not predicate the Board's jurisdiction
on a certain dollar value of out-of-state purchases but rather on the fact that
many industries, themselves involved in interstate commerce, were supplied by
Consolidated Edison.s
Both Jones & Laughlin and Consolidated Edison dealt with large corporations
engaged in extensive interstate activities. But what of the small businessan
whose products come from or reach interstate commerce? NLRB v. Fainblatt0
made it clear that volume of business had little bearing on the applicability of
the act.20 The criterion, the Court said, was the effect which the business had
on interstate commerce. A few years later in Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB?'
the Court set forth what is now the accepted test of jurisdiction:
10. 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1958).
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § S. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce
... among the several States, [and] . . .To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. . .."
12. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 1S1 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1950).
13. Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1297, 1Z99 (1954).
14. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
15. "Whether or not particular action does affect commerce in such a close and intimate
fashion as to he subject to federal control, and hence to lie within the authority conferred
upon the Board, is left by the statute to be determined as individual cases arise." Id. at 32.
16. 305 U.S. 197 (193S).
17. Id. at 222.
18. In the instant case, the Board argued that this only infers that "where other, more
dramatic, evidence of a connection v.ith interstate commerce was present, the Court found
it unnecessary to rest the case on the 'lesser' factors as well." Brief for Petitioner on Re-
hearing, p. 10, NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 297 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1962).
19. 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
20. "The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to
all such commerce be it great or small.... The language of the National Labor Relations
Act seems to make it plain that Congress has set no restrictions upon the jurisdiction of
the Board to be determined or fixed exclusively by reference to the volume of interstate
commerce involved." Id. at 606. It should be noted that while the Court here .as referring
to an extension rather than a restriction, as in the instant case, of the Board's jurisdiction,
the applicable principle remains the same, i.e., that there must be a showing of an effect
on interstate commerce.
21. 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
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Congress gave the Board authority to prevent practices "tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."...
Congress therefore left it to the Board to ascertain whether proscribed practices
would in particular situations adversely affect commerce when judged by the full
reach of the constitutional power of Congress. Whether or no practices may be
deemed by Congress -to affect interstate commerce is not to be determined by con-
fining judgment to the quantitative effect of the activities immediately before the
Board. Appropriate for judgment is the fact that the immediate situation is repre-
sentative of many others throughout the country, the total incidence of which if left
unchecked may well become far-reaching in its harm to commerce.
22
Mr. Justice Black, however, in his concurring opinion, was not willing to go
that far. He pointed out that while Congress had the power to enact laws
which were "necessary and proper" to protect interstate commerce, clear
findings of the effect on commerce have always been required "before sub-
jecting local business to paramount federal regulation.1 23
In 1950, faced with the problem of a staggering caseload and a limited
budget, the Board, in accordance with the act,2 4 promulgated jurisdictional
standards25 Under these standards, the Board would exercise its powers only
when the business involved had annual interstate purchases above certain
minimum dollar values.2 6 In 195427 and 195828 these standards were revised
with a view toward limiting rather than expanding the Board's jurisdiction.
The prescribed standards, at first, seemed to solve the Board's caseload prob-
lem. However, after the revision in 1954, the Supreme Court, by its decision
in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,g created, in the labor-relations field, a
so-called "no mans land."'30 In 1958 the Board relaxed its 1954 tests, limiting
but not eliminating the "no mans land."131 Section 701 of the Labor-Manage-
22. Id. at 648.
23. Id. at 652.
24. National Labor Relations Act § 6(a), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1958).
25. For a compilation of these standards, see 26 L.R.R.M. 50 (1950). See also Hollow
Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635 (1950). These standards reflected, for the most part,
results reached by the Board in determining prior jurisdictional questions. 15 NLRB
Ann. Rep. 5 (1950).
26. The test later became a certain gross volume of business. See notes 27-28 infra.
27. NLRB Press Releases Nos. 445 & 449, July 1 & 15, 1954, 34 L.R.R.M. 75 (1954).
28. NLRB Press Release No. 576, Oct. 2, 1958, 42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1958). See Slomons
Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958). The 1958 standards are in effect today except
that they were extended to include the hotel industry in 1959. NLRB Press Release No.
610, May 14, 1959, 44 L.R.R.M. 70 (1959). For a detailed enumeration of these standards,
see Comment, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 737, 747-48 (1960).
29. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
30. The Guss decision precluded state courts and agencies from acting on matters over
which, because they affected commerce, the NLRB had, but declined to assert, Jurisdiction
since the minimum dollar value standard had not been met. Ibid. See Notes, 26 Fordharn
L. Rev. 349 (1957); 71 Harv. L. Rev. 179 (1957); 56 Mich. L. Rev. 133 (1957).
31. See note 28 supra.
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ment Reporting and Disclosure Act,32 amending Section 14 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, attempted33 to eliminate the remaining area of the "no mans land." State
courts and agencies, under this amendment are permitted to act on matters
over which the Board has declined to assert jurisdiction. The Board's jurisdic-
tion has been frozen, so to speak, by the Reporting and Disclosure Act since
the Board cannot "decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over
which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August
1, 1959."34 Although the standards had now received congressional approval,
they have yet to be formally approved by the United States Supreme Court.03
In the present case, respondent, Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., sold fuel oil to
and serviced oil burners and boilers for home owners, all of whom lived in
New York State. In 1959 it purchased from Gulf Oil Corp. fuel oil and
products valued at more than $650,000. This oil was refined outside New York
State and eventually shipped to stationary storage tanks in New York. Re-
spondent's trucks then withdrew the oil from the storage tanks and delivered
it directly to its customers. 36 The trial examiner, whose decision was adopted
by the Board, found that the NLRB had jurisdiction of the dispute.37
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in refusing to
enforce the order reasoned:
[T]he Supreme Court, however, seems never to have gone so far as to hold that mere
size of a local business or amount of its purchases within the state of materials the
origin of which was outside the state, without relation to other factors necessarily
brings it within the Act. 3s
Anticipating possible review by the Supreme Court, the court stated that it
seemed unlikely, because of the caution expressed in Howell Chcvrolct Co. v.
NLRB,39 and Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB,4 0 that the Supreme Court would
32. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
33. Since the vast majority of states are without labor relations statutes, the complainant
over whom the N LRB declines to assert jurisdiction because he did not meet its dollar value
standard could be left without a remedy. Note, 29 Fordham L. Rev. C-04 (1961). See
Comment, 28 Fordham L. Rev. 737 (1960). However it might be argued that since a federal
question is involved, federal law should be applied by the state. The question has yet to
be answered.
34. Labor-Mlanagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 701(a), 73 Stat. 541, 29
U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
35. "This Court has never passed and we do not pass today upon the validity of any
particular declination of jurisdiction by the Board or any set of jurisdictional standards."
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 4 (1957). See S. Rep. No. 1S71 6th Cong.,
1st Sess. 26 (1959).
36. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1170 (1961).
37. Id. at 1171.
38. 297 F.2d at 97.
39. 346 U.S. 482 (1953). This case involved an automobile dealer in California vwho-e
purchases from General Motors exceeded $1,000,000. The Court upheld the Board's i=ertion
of jurisdiction because the evidence showed such a close supervision of the dealer's activitie3
by General Motors that it was "'an integral part' of General Motors' national system
of distribution." Id. at 434.
40. 322 U.S. 643 (1944); see notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
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today adopt a pure "quantitative" test.41 Therefore the court remanded the
case to the NLRB to take more evidence to fill in a "reasonably complete pic-
ture of the manner in which a work stoppage would affect commerce ... before
we rule on the jurisdictional issue." 42 In denying the petition for rehearing
the court reiterated what it deemed to be the jurisdictional test laid down by
Congress, namely:
[I]f the employer is himself engaged in interstate commerce, without more the
jurisdiction of the Board is established. If the employer is not engaged in interstate
commerce, the acts in question must lead or tend to lead to a dispute which must
burden or obstruct the free flow of interstate commerce.43
Similarly in Benevento44 the Board's jurisdiction was based on the'trial exam-
iner's finding that
during the calendar year preceding the issuance of the complaint, respondent sold
products valued in excess of $50,000 to . . .which company during the same calendar
year purchased and received, from sources outside the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, products valued in excess of $50,000.45
The first circuit in refusing to enforce the Board's order stated that "broad
though the Board's power may be it is not unlimited." 40 The court reasoned
that "the Board's jurisdiction is necessarily subject to bounds and the criterion
for determining where those bounds lie is the effect, if any, of purely local
action upon interstate commerce,"4 7 and therefore concluded that "clear find-
ings of fact based upon legally sufficient evidence must be made by the Board
to support its assertion of jurisdiction. '48
The NLRB's position in both cases is that since respondents met its gross
dollar standard and dealt with firms engaged in commerce, they must neces-
sarily affect interstate commerce. As previously noted, originally the Board's
jurisdiction was so broad that it heretofore imposed limitations upon itself.40
In both of these cases, however, it seems that the Board, by its preoccupation
with jurisdictional standards, has overlooked the original test laid down by
41. An analogy can be developed here. In a recent decision, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), 30 Fordham L. Rev. 493 (1962), the Supreme Court
abandoned a "quantitative substantiality" test in favor of a "rule of reason" or "qualita-
tive substantiality" test to determine market foreclosure under Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). While the "quantitative" test In Tampa
had originally been judicially imposed and in the instant case it has been imposed by the
NLRB, an administrative body, the analogy remains, for the Supreme Court showed Its
willingness to abandon an easier, more practical test in favor of a more difficult to apply,
yet fairer test.
42. 297 F.2d at 99.
43. Ibid.
44. 297 F.2d 873 (1st Cir. 1961).
45. Michael Benevento, 131 N.L.R.B. 358, 361 (1961).
46. 297 F.2d at 874.
47. Id. at 875.
48. Id. at 876.
49. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
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Congress.5 0 Throughout the years the Supreme Court has consistently main-
tained that it is the effect on commerce and not a gross volume of business
which is the standard.r1
'While it is arguable that a company which does a gross volume of business
in excess of $500,000 and which purchases its products from one engaged in
interstate commerce02 would, if involved in a labor dispute, affect interstate
commerce, such a conclusion, as the NLRB has itself admitted, is not a neces-
sary conclusion.5 3 By virtue of its present argument, however, it would appear
that the Board has reversed its former position.
The Board's present position is a pragmatic one; if it is forced to take more
evidence in these cases it would have to drastically revise its present procedure
of deciding jurisdictional questions. But the Board itself has recognized the
dual requirement before it can assert jurisdiction. 4
It may be that the Supreme Court will agree with the Board and in approv-
ing its standards promulgate an easily applied "quantitative" test. In reaching
this conclusion the Court might rely on the congressional approval given the
standards in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. This
seems unlikely for two reasons: First, the act still requires a showing of an
effect on commerce and second, had Congress wanted to adopt a single quanti-
tative test it would have expressly done so.
It is submitted that the first and second circuits' adherence to the estab-
lished principles laid down in Jones & Laughlin, Consolidated Edison, Polish
Nat'l Alliance, and Fainblatt is far more just and legally sound than the
Board's reliance on its non-judicially approved self imposed standards.
50. See note 15 supra.
51. See notes 14-23 supra and accompanying text.
52. Or, as in Benevento, that one who sells products valued in excess of $50,CCD to one
who purchases products from outside the state.
53. "It is possible, although highly improbable, that an enterprise meeting the gross
dollar standards of the Board would not come within the broad definition of 'affecting
commerce,' even though that term has been judicially determined to indicate an intention
on the part of Congress to exercise Federal jurisdiction to the fullest possible extent. For
this reason we agree . . . that the gross dollar volume test, standing alone, is innufficient
to confer upon the Board the jurisdiction contemplated by the Act." International Long-
shoremen & Warehousemen's Union, 124 N.L.R.B. 813, 815 (1959).
54. "The Board's current standard for exercising jurisdiction over a retail enterprise
which falls within its statutory jurisdiction is 'a gross volume of business of at least
$500,000 per annum .. . .' In such instances 'some proof must be made of legal jurisdic-
tion,' that is, that the employer involved is engaged in commerce or that his operations
affect commerce . . . in addition to a showing that the relevant gross volume test has
been satisfied." Westside Market Owners Ass'n, 126 N.L.R.B. 167, 169 (1960); see James
D. Jackson, 126 N.L.R.B. 875 (1960); International Longshoremen & Warehousemen's
Union, supra note 53.
55. Section 701(a) of the act, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (Supp. II, 1959-
1960) ; see notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
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Sales-Absence of Privity in Action for Breach of Express Warranty.-
Plaintiff brought an action in contract for breach of an express warranty1
against defendant-manufacturer, alleging that fabrics treated with defendant's
"Cyana" process shrank and lost their shape when washed. Plaintiff had
purchased the allegedly defective fabrics from Apex Knitted Fabrics, Inc. and
Fairtex Mills, Inc.2 which were licensed by defendant-manufacturer to treat
their textiles with the "Cyana" process.3 The court at special term4 denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment, a motion made on the ground
that there was no privity of contract. The appellate division unanimously
affirmed the order and certified the question with respect to the requirement of
privity of contract to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that privity of contract is not essential to the maintenance of an action
against a manufacturer for breach of express warranty where the representa-
tions of the manufacturer have induced the buyer to make the purchase. Randy
Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
Prior to the case of Greenberg v. LorenzO New York followed the general
rule that "there can be no warranty where there is no privity of contract."7
Greenberg was the first successful attack on the privity rule in a warranty
1. "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods Is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the
buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." N.Y.
Pers. Prop. Law § 93.
2. In a prior action Fairtex Mills, Inc. made a motion for summary judgment on the
basis of contract provisions disclaiming any liability, but the court of appeals denied
the motion stating "that issues of fact exist which require a trial for their determination."
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 7 N.Y.2d 791, 793, 163 N.E.2d 349, 194
N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (1959) (per curiam).
3. American Cyanamid and its licensees enter into quality control agreements under
which the licensees agree to follow certain requirements set by American Cyanamid.
Licensees were also required to secure letters from their customers that tags and labels
furnished by American Cyanamid would only be affixed to "Cyana" treated fabrics.
Applications for "Cyana" tags and labels were made by the purchaser through the
licensee so that at no step of the distributive process did American Cyanamid deal directly
with the subpurchaser.
4. 26 Misc. 2d 476, 207 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
5. 13 App. Div. 2d 451, 214 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1st Dep't 1961) (memorandum decision).
6. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
7. Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 74, 161 N.E. 423, 424 (1928).
In the leading New York case of Chysky v. Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576
(1923), the court of appeals set down the general rule "that a manufacturer or seller of
food, or other articles of personal property, is not liable to third persons, under an Implied
warranty, who have no contractual relations with him. The reason for this rule is that
privity of contract does not exist between the seller and such third persons, and unless there
be privity of contract, there can be no implied warranty." Id. at 472, 139 N.E. at 578. In
Turner the court extended the privity rule to express warranties stating that "a cause of
action for breach of warranty, either express or implied, is not, and cannot be, stated . .
without a showing of privity. 248 N.Y. at 74, 161 N.E. at 424.
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action, but the court of appeals attached a caveat, warning that its decision to
extend the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability to members of
the purchaser's family should not be taken as a signal that New York was
prepared to completely abolish the privity rule.s The instant case, while it
further weakens the traditional requirement of privity, again demonstrates
the ambivalent attitude of the court of appeals tomrds this so-called "old
court-made rule."9
It has been said that "there is no more troublesome word in the law than
the word 'warranty' ... ,"10 and this is due in no small part to its historical
evolution from a tort to contract action." In its origin the action for breach
of warranty was on the case in deceit,'"2 and it was not until 177S13 that
assumpsit was first recognized as a form of action for breach of warranty. In
succeeding years the contractual aspect of warranty assumed greater impor-
tance, and the courts came to apply basic contract theory including the privity
rule to warranty actions.' 4
An express warranty may be either: (1) a warranty derived from an ex-
press promise; or, (2) a warranty imposed by law because of express rep-
resentations.15 In the present case the warranty was based on the express
representations embodied in American Cyanamid's advertisements in trade
journals and other media.' 6 The express warranty found by the court, there-
3. 9 N.Y.2d at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 775-76, 213 N.YS.2d at 42-43. Both De-mond,
C. J., writing for the majority, and Froessel, J., in a concurring opinion, strczzd the fact
that on three different occasions the New York State Law Revision Commion had
recommended that the benefits of implied warranties be extended to the purch-a-r' em-
ployees and members of his household, but the legislature on each occasion deined to
act. For a study of these proposals see N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(B) (1959); N.Y. Leg. Doc.
No. 65(A) (1945); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(J) (1943). See also Comment, Implied Warranty
and the Defense of Privity in a Personal Injury Action, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 4S4 (1962)
for a study of the present effect of Greenberg v. Lorenz on the law of warranty in New
York.
9. 11 N.Y.2d at 16, 131 N.E.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
10. 1 Williston, Sales § 181, at 463 (rev. ed. 1943).
11. For an excellent study of the history of warranty see Proszer, The Implied Warranty
of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117, 113-22 (1943).
12. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (133) states that warranty
"was, in its origin, a pure action of tort .... A vendor who gives a false warranty may
be charged to-day, of course, in contract; but the conception of such a v.arranty, as a
contract, is quite modem." Id. at S. See also Prosser, Torts § 33, at 493 (2d cd. 195);
Williston, Sales § 195, at 501-03 (rev. ed. 1943).
13. Stuart v. Wrilkin, 1 Doug. 1S, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1773).
14. See 1 Hursh, American Law of Products Liability §§ 6:14-:16 (1961).
15. Vold, Sales § 84, at 426-27 (2d ed. 1959).
16. The court noted that plaintiff based its case not only on express representations
through advertising, but also on the tags and labels bearing the legend "Cyana finish" which
were affixed to the fabrics. 11 N.Y.2d at 15, 181 N.E.2d at 403, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 369. The
presence of the tags and labels was indeed a strong factor in plaintiff's favor, but it appears
that even in their absence defendant would have been liable for breach of expre v.arranty
solely on its express representations via advertising.
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fore, was one imposed by law based on the express representations made by
American Cyanamid to the public.17
In our modem system of sales distribution the manufacturer and ultimate
purchaser or consumer do not, in the ordinary case, contract directly. While
the products of manufacturers are sold through intermediaries, the advertising
of these same manufacturers via newspapers, trade journals, television, radio,
and other media is what most often induces the buyer to make the purchase.
In dispensing with the privity rule in the instant case the court of appeals
took note of "present-day commercial practices"18 stating that "the world of
merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world of contract; it is, rather, a world
of advertising. ... 19 The express representations, therefore, made by a
manufacturer through the mass communications media, which induce the buyer
to make the purchase, constitute express warranties running to the ultimate
purchaser.20
The court of appeals not only recognized that the express representations
of a manufacturer will now run to the ultimate purchaser, but also allowed
the injured purchaser to recover in an action in contract. The court could have
rehabilitated the common-law action in deceit for breach of express warranty,
which did not require scienter on the part of the seller,21 but it appears that
the instant decision is based on a relationship 22 created between the manu-
facturer and the ultimate purchaser due to the former's express representations.
This relationship between the manufacturer and ultimate purchaser should
involve a consideration of three factors: (1) the extent and nature of the
express representations made by the manufacturer to the public; (2) whether
these express representations had the natural tendency of inducing the buyer
to make the purchase; and, (3) whether the buyer relied on the express rep-
resentations in making the purchase.
While the present case represents another breach in the privity rule in New
York, it must be viewed with caution.2 3 Privity is no longer necessary in an
17. See 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.24, at 1587-88 (1956); Note, Manufacturer's
Advertisement as Express Warranty to Consumer, 7 Wash. L. Rev. 351 (1932).
18. 11 N.Y.2d at 12, 181 N.E.2d at 402, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
19. Ibid.
20. The court of appeals cited with approval the case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), 18 Cornell L.Q. 445 (1933), 46 Harv. L. Rev, 162, 81
U. Pa. L. Rev. 94, where the requirement of privity in an action for breach of exprefs
warranty was first dispensed with.
21. Cross v. Gardner, 1 Show. 68, 89 Eng. Rep. 453 (K.B. 1689).
22. Williston states that this "relation [to support an action in contract] ... might
under some circumstances exist between manufacturer and subpurchaser and conceivably
even between the manufacturer and a consumer who is neither a purchaser nor sub-
purchaser." 1 Williston, Sales § 244(a), at 649-50 (rev. ed. 1948).
23. Froessel, J., in his concurring opinion, in which Dye, J. and Van Voorhis, 3. joined,
agreed with the result, but warned that the court should not "dispense with the re-
quirement of privity without limitation." 11 N.Y.2d at 16, 181 N.E.2d at 405, 226 N.Y.S.2d
at -. See also the concurring opinion of Froessel, 3., in Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d
at 200-01, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
[Vol. 30
1962] CASE NOTES
action for breach of express warranty imposed by law, where the requisite
relationship is established between the manufacturer and his subpurchaser. If
the express warranty were a term of the contract between the manufacturer and
his purchaser, lack of privity would still appear to bar a subpurchaser's action.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether an injured party other than a subpurchaser
would be allowed a recovery without a showing of privity.
The effect of the present case is to lighten further the burden of proof for
a plaintiff not in privity with a defendant-manufacturer, while in turn the
area of risk for the manufacturer is extended.24 To recover in negligence a
plaintiff must prove not only the existence of a duty but also the breach of that
duty, i.e., negligence on the part of the manufacturer.2 Under the rule here
set forth the plaintiff need only show that the product was defective when
bought.2 6
While the rule now announced by the court of appeals is considered more
realistic in the light of modern economic and social conditions,2 it must be
noted that the court has said it will only "take one step at a time" in eliminating
the traditional requirement of privity in warranty actions.23 New Yorl: has
now dispensed with the privity rule in two types of warranty cases: (1) those
involving foodstuffs and household goods where the implied warranties of
fitness and merchantability now run to members of the purchaser's family -3
and, (2) cases involving express representations by the manufacturer to the
ultimate purchaser which will support an action for breach of express warranty. °
24. Meehan, "The Assault Upon the Citadel of Privity": A Recent Communique, 24
Brooklyn L. Rev. 303 (1953).
25. See Davis, A Re-Examination of the Doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick and Its
Application and Extension in the State of New York, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 204 (1955).
26. The court stated: "If the ultimate fault for the plaintiff's loss is actually that of
Fairtex and Apex, Cyanamid's appropriate recourse is against them." 11 N.Y.2d at 15, 181
NE.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 370. From this statement it appears that plaintiff need only
prove the product was defective when purchased from the middleman, and not when it
left the manufacturer.
27. See, e.g., Llewelyn, Cases on Sales 342 (1930); Bogert & Fink, Business Practice
Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400, 415-17 (1930); Jeanblanc,
Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendee, 24 Va. L. Rev.
134 (1937); Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Deviccs, 24
Colum. L. Rev. 335, 357-59 (1924).
23. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
29. This exception would come within the provisions of the proposed Uniform Com-
mercial Code which provides that "a seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, cons-ume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A celler
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section." Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-318.
30. The exception created by the instant case would not come within § 2-318 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, but it would be within the spirit of the purpos. clauze to
§ 2-318 which states that "the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
It is expected that in the future there will be further successful assaults on
the "citadel of privity" with the result that the privity rule in warranty will
follow the same path as it did in the law of negligence with respect to a manu-
facturer's liability to the consumer.3 '
Trade Regulation-Robinson-Patman Act-Good Faith Defense of Meet-
ing Competition Held to Justify Major Gasoline Supplier's Discriminatory
Price Reduction to Dealer Engaged in a Price Battle at Consumer Level.
-Petitioner, Sun Oil Company, filed a petition seeking to review and set aside
a cease and desist order of the Federal Trade Commission.' The Commission
had charged petitioner with a secondary-line2 price discrimination in violation
of Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,8 alleging that petitioner had sold
its gasoline to a dealer, McLean, at prices substantially lower than the prices
charged to its other dealers in the same market area.4 In defense, petitioner
asserted that its concession to McLean was a good-faith price reduction to meet
competition, at the consumer level, from Super-Test, a supplier-retailer.
The Commission held that the defense provided by section 2 (b) 0 was not avail-
able to a seller when the reduction was made to permit the seller's customers
to meet their competition, regardless of whether petitioner was in danger of
losing a customer. The court of appeals set aside the cease and desist order,
holding that the defense of meeting competition was available to a supplier of
gasoline when its purchaser was engaged in a price war with a supplier-retailer
at the consumer level. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961). 7
the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells,
extend to other persons in the distributive chain."
31. See Koerner, The Beleaguered Citadel of Privity in the Distributive Process of the
Sale of Goods, 7 N.Y.L.F. 176 (1961); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960). See also the recent case of Thomas
v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (4th Dep't 1962), where the court held
that an employee could recover, in either express or implied warranty, for injuries
sustained when a chair collapsed which was purchased by his employer from defendant-
supplier.
1. Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955 (1959).
2. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). A secondary-line price discrimina-
tion occurs at the retail or intermediate level between supplier and consumer.
3. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
4. McLean was one of thirty-eight retail dealers supplied by petitioner in the Jackson-
ville area. 55 F.T.C. at 957.
5. Super-Test Oil Co. is a so-called "independent," supplying a non-major brand of
gasoline, and operating its own filling stations. The evidence established that such brands
usually sell at about two cents below major brands. Super-Test cut its price as much as
eight cents below McLean's. McLean could not absorb such a price cut without a reduction
by Sun Oil. Id. at 957-58.
6. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
7. Although the Commission found that petitioner and his dealer had entered Into
a price fixing agreement in violation of § I of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890),
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The primary purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was to protect smal
buyers from price discriminations favoring large purchasers who sought to
impair the commercial position of smaller competitors and thereby capture a
greater portion of the market.8 Consequently, section 2(a) of the act prohibits
any price discrimination which may "substantially . . . lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them... '*
Price discrimination has been construed to mean any price differential and
therefore a seller is required, under section 2(a), to offer uniform prices to his
competing purchasers.' 0
The requisite injury to competition resulting from a price discrimination
may occur at different competitive levels. In all cases, however, the burden is on
the petitioner to establish: (1) the price discrimination and (2) the anti-competi-
tive effects." Whether the competitive injury is alleged at the primary or the
secondary level, the petitioner must establish a reasonable possibility of injury
to the competing seller (at the primary level) or competing purchaser (at the
secondary level).1- This burden is more easily satisfied where a secondary-line
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (195S), which the Supreme Court held unlawful per se in United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the instant court found "no substantial
evidence to support the Commission's finding of a price-fixing agreement. 294 F2d at 433.
S. FTC, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 90 (1935).
9. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. Ir, 1959-1960). The
injury proviso was an addition made by the Robinson-Patman legislators with the intent
of broadening the effects requirements of the original Clayton Act, which Congrecs con-
sidered to be too restrictive in requiring that the discrimination affect comptition
generally rather than the victimized competitor.
10. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 US. 536 (1960); see Standard Mlotor Prods,
Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. S26 (1959). "It has been
many times held by the Supreme Court that price differentials, not justified by a chov.ing of
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery, become price discriminations and
are prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act ... ." Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 233 F2d
43, 49 (Sti Cir. 1956).
11. Doubt was cast upon this proposition by a per curiam decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 373
(1945). There the court held that the burden was on the accused to disprove, rather than on
the accuser to prove, the existence of adverse effects to competition. The court reasoned that
§§ 2(a) and 2(b) when read together operated to shift "the burden of proof to anyone who
sets two prices... 2' Id. at 379. The rule, however, as enunciated in Moss was dis-
credited by the FTC itself, when it stated "that under Section 2(a), counsel supporting
the complaint has the burden of proof to establish the necessary competitive injury."
General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, S90 (1954). Moreover, the Supreme Court in FTC
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.. 536 (1960), in a dictum, took pains to point out that its
decision in that case should not be interpreted to "raLse the spector of a flat prohibition
of price differentials, inasmuch as price differences constitute but one element of a § 2(a)
violation." Id. at 553.
12. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46, 47 (1943); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v.
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price discrimination is alleged, than where the requisite injury is alleged at
the primary level because, as a practical matter, no reasonable possibility of
injury can be shown at the primary level without extensive market surveys and
studies.13 At the secondary level, however, the very fact of the price differ-
ential would tend to indicate a possibility of injury.14
Not all price discriminations are prohibited. The act provides a defense to
a charge of price discrimination, based on cost justification.' 5 However, the
effectiveness of this affirmative defense has been restricted due to evidentiary
problems. 16 Section 2(b) of the act makes another defense available by pro-
viding that "nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima
facie case thus made by showing that his lower price . . . was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor .... M
This section of the act has been narrowly construed by the Commission.
Originally the FTC viewed the defense as merely procedural; i.e., evidence
that the effect of the discrimination was actually rather than potentially to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition would overcome proof that the price
discrimination *as made to meet the price offered by a competitor. 18 The
Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,19 expressly rejected this conten-
FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945); Atlas Building Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co.,
269 F.2d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
13. The lengths to which the FTC has gone in market analysis are readily cognizable
from the extensiveness of its fact findings. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C.
277 (1957); General Motors Corp., 50 F.T.C. 54 (1953); Champion Spark Plug Co.,
50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
14. As the Supreme Court stated in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948), a
showing in itself that suppliers "sell their goods to some customers substantially cheaper
than they sell like goods to the competitors of these customers . . . is sufficient to justify
our conclusion that the Commission's findings of injury to competition were adequately
supported by evidence." Id. at 50-51. Substantiality, the Court indicates earlier In this
same opinion, could simply depend upon whether the "discounts . . . result In price
differentials between competing purchasers sufficient in amount to influence their resale
prices . . . ." Id. at 47. Superficially this decision would appear to reinstate the Moss
ruling. It is to be noted, however, that Moss' automatic violation restriction, which was
founded on spurious reasoning, would have applied not only to secondary-line but also
to primary-line cases.
15. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
16. "Proof of a cost justification being what it is, too often no one can ascertain
whether a price is cost-justified." Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,
79 (1953) ; see Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 172 (1955). But see Reid v. Harper
& Bros., 235 F.2d 420 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952 (1956) where a cost study
made in good faith and in accord with good accounting techniques was a valid defense to a
§ 2(a) violation.
17. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
18. Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945).
19. 340 U.S. 231 (1951). Standard Oil sold large quantities of gasoline to jobbers In the
Detroit area at tank-car prices. Standard also sold gasoline directly to service stations at
higher prices, called tank-wagon prices. As a result, retailers buying from jobbers enjoyed a
lower price than those buying directly from Standard. The defense of meeting competition
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tion, and held the defense to be absolute regardless of any injury to other
competing purchasers. Although the defense is absolute, certain limitations on
its use have been imposed by the courts. A seller may not assert the defense
when the purpose is to gain a new customer and not merely to retain an old
one.20 Furthermore, the price met must be a lawful one.2 ' Finally, the price
reduction must be in response to an individual competitive situation, rather
than the mere adoption of a competitor's pricing system.P
The defense, therefore, raises a question of fact as to whether the defendant
is really meeting competitione2 and places emphasis on "individual competi-
tive situations."2 4 The Commission in the instant case construed section 2(b)
literally,25 failing thereby to consider that the situation of the retailer in the
gasoline industry differs significantly from that of the normal retailer.20 Based
on a "clear meaning" approach to the act, the Commission took the position
that the defense may be validly asserted only when the competition met is at
the supplier level, a proposition enunciated in Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas
was held absolute. Dissenting Justices Reed, inson, and Black believed that the intent of
the legislators was to make the defense merely procedural and that the defense would h
nullified by proof of sufficient competitive injury caused by the § 2(a) violation.
20. See, e.g., FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945); Standard Motor Prods.,
Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959). But see Att'y
Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. (1955), where the committee was of the opinion that
"Standard Oil does not confine the 'good faith' proviso solely to defensive reductions to
retain an existing customer." Id. at 134.
21. See E. Edelmann & Co., 51 F.T.C. 973, 996, 1010 (1955), afi'd, 239 F.2d 152 (7th
CAr. 1956). For a discussion of the meeting of an unlawful price see FTC v. A. E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945) (illegal basing point system).
22. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, 401 (1953); FTC v. National Lead
Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 633, 725 (1943). The
Commission had also taken the view that the § 2(b) defens may not be asserted where
the seller discriminates by way of reimbursement to a particular buyer for cupplying
services and facilities in violation of § 2(d) of the act. A court of appeals has recently over-
ruled this contention in holding that the § 2(b) defense is equally available to both § 2(d)
offenses (furnishing dollar allowances) and § 2(e) offenses (furnishing services). Exquisite
Form Brassiere, Inc., v. FTC, 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cas.) 9 70157 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 22, 1961).
23. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945), where the question presented
was whether the competition justified the price discrimination.
24. "The Act thus places emphasis upon individual competitive situations, rather than
upon a general system of competition." FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 6S3, 725 (194S).
25. "Respondent would equate its dealers' competition with its own competition, but
of course this is not the law .... Respondent could, if it chose to, meet such competition at
the dealer level by nondiscriminatory reductions in price to all dealers, or by operating
its own stations and thus being in direct competition with other stations which reduce
prices." 55 F.T.C. at 965 (1959).
26. "If gasoline could be canned like tomatoes and stocked like bottle goods, and if
gasoline suppliers competed with each other for the retail merchant's trade, the Com-
mission's reading of Section 2(b) would be more realistic and more reasonable than is
here presented." 294 F.2d at 476 (1961).
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Co. 2 7 In that case, defendant-oil refiner, faced with declining gasoline sales
due to a local price war, granted price reductions to certain dealers who in turn
matched, but did not undercut, prices charged by competing service stations
selling rival brands. In an action brought by one of the defendant's dealers
who had not received the discount, the district court, adopting a rather restric-
tive interpretation, held that the defendant was not, within the term of the
act, meeting an equally low price of a competitor. Defendant could justify its
discrimination, according to the court, only by demonstrating that its price
reduction was accomplished to meet an equally low price made available to its
customer by a competing oil company. At the same time, the court acknowl-
edged that it was a mere fiction to speak of competition at the supplier level
in the gasoline industry.
The instant court rejected the Enterprise approach, pointing out that the
latter decision deprived the major oil companies of any realistic method of
meeting a competitor's price at the only level where competition actually exists.
Gasoline suppliers, because of the peculiar organization of the industry, do not
compete for the business of supplying filling stations, but are in fact competing
at the consumer level through dealer outlets. The instant court recognized that
"a filling station operator carrying a brand-name gasoline does not buy from
several competing oil companies." 28 The real competition is not at the supplier-
to-retailer level, but rather the supplier-to-customer level, with the gasoline
station operator acting as a mere conduit for a particular supplier's product.
Gasoline suppliers are actually competing for customers in the consumer market
through their respective dealer-outlets. This is evidenced by the fact that the
supplier carries the burden of promoting and advertising the sale of its gasoline
at the consumer level. It is, therefore, a fiction to speak of a secondary or
retail level in the oil industry. With respect to competition, the relationship
of petitioner to its retailer, McLean, is identical with that of a vertically
integrated competitor to its outlet. Clearly, the supplier in the oil industry,
in order to protect its market, must be allowed to make discriminatory price
cuts, which, albeit indirectly, meet competition under section 2 (b).20
The court found the wording of the statute sufficiently vague to support
either the FTC's reasoning or its own approach. Therefore, the court reasoned
that the act should be interpreted so as to provide the most meaningful solu-
tion, in light of the particular competitive situation, and attempted to reconcile
the act as far as possible with the general tenets of antitrust law, i.e., to pre-
serve competition to the extent permissible under the act. The court recognized
that adherence to the literal construction of section 2(b) under the Commis-
27. 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1957).
28. 294 F.2d at 472. The instant court also noted that in Enterprise the respondent,
Texas Co., failed to give evidence of the price of its competing refiner. It also failed
to give evidence that the prices of its competitor were lawful. Finally, Texas Co. did
not show that their prices were not lower than its competitors. The case is thus distin-
guishable on these grounds. Id. at 472 n.18.
29. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC. 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
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sion's order would force a supplier to either: (1) lower its prices uniformly to
all its retailers in the same area; (2) vertically integrate; or finally, (3) main-
tain uniform prices and place the burden on the retailer to meet its competi-
tion. The court observed that the first alternative might set off "price wars
throughout Florida and the Southeastern United States."-' O On the other hand,
vertical integration is clearly repugnant to general antitrust philosophy.3 ' The
third alternative would actually force the retailer out of business, which was
the eventual result in the present case.32 Although Congress did not contem-
plate a situation where the interests of a small merchant and a large supplier
coincide, the general purpose of the legislation-to protect small businessmen-
is beyond dispute.
In effect, the Commission would have sacrificed the only existing area of
competition in this industry, as well as the independent dealer, for the salke of
a rigid control standard. Such a per se approach to a concededly ambiguous
statute would frustrate the major intent of the act, the protection of the small
businessman.
30. 294 F.2d at 480.
31. E.g., United States v. E. I. du Pontede Nemours & Co., 351 U.. 377 (1956); United
States %% Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 21S (1947). A Senate report approving of the Enter-
prise doctrine nevertheless strongly disapproved of increased vertical integration. S. Rep.
No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-24 (1956).
32. 294 F.2d at 470.
33. See note S supra and accompanying text.
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